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VALUES, PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING MILITARY SERVICE

Jerald G. Bachman June, 1973

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13 ABSTRACT				

This report explores perceptions and attitudes concerning military service, and the way they are linked to views about enlistment. Data are based on a sixteen-page self-completed questionnaire administered to a national sample of civilians and a cross-section of Navy personnel. Trends related to age and education are examined for five analysis groups: civilian men, civilian women, Navy enlisted men in their first tour of duty, enlisted men in their second or later tour, and officers.

Chapter topics include: perceptions of military work roles, military effectiveness and efficiency, military influence over national policy, foreign policy and military power, issues involved in an all-volunteer force, pro- and anti-enlistment attitudes.

Navy and civilian respondents agree that the services offer good opportunities for education and assuming responsibility, but that chances are limited for "personal fulfillment" and getting one's ideas heard. Highest ratings of military work roles come from Navy officers and later-term enlisted men; lowest ratings come from the 84 percent of first-term enlisted men who do not plan to re-enlist.

Analyses by age show young men in their twenties to be most consistently critical of the military services. Analyses by education show college-educated people to be less favorable in attitudes toward the military services, more critical of past military actions in Vietnam.

The findings support the conclusion that ideological issues play an important part in attitudes about enlistment or re-enlistment.

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VALUES, PREFERENCES AND PERCEPTIONS CONCERNING MILITARY SERVICE

June, 1973

Institute for Social Research University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan

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PREFACE

This report presents our first analysis of data, collected in late 1972 and early 1973, dealing with people's perceptions and attitudes about the military services. Such an analysis is particularly relevant at a point in time when the nation is returning to an all-volunteer system for staffing the military services.

We will not summarize the findings here, since the abstract and chapter summaries provide a better source of summary information. But we must take a moment to caution the reader that this is a preliminary report, based on only a few weeks of data analysis. Many areas for further analysis have been uncovered in this preliminary review of the data, and we will explore them in the months of work to follow.

This examination of perceptions and attitudes about military service is one portion of a larger project which includes an examination and comparison of Navy and civilian work role experiences. Our later efforts will include an integration of the several streams of analysis represented in this and other initial reports.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A number of colleagues collaborated in the design of the items and indexes presented here, and several of them also read and commented on an early draft of this report. Thanks are due to David Bowers, Lloyd Johnston, Jerome Johnston, and Patrick O'Malley.

Donna Ando carried much of the burden of preparing this report, including data analysis, construction of tables and figures, and coordination of typing and duplicating. Her cheerfulness, efficiency and creativity in carrying out these duties did much to ease the writer's task and improve the product. Gail Ackley typed the final copy, with assistance from Grace Stribley.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In an all-volunteer system, adequate staffing of the armed forces depends upon the perceived attractiveness of military service as a work role. Such perceptions include views on working conditions in the services, levels of compensation, fringe benefits, and the like; but they also include broader considerations of what the nation's military policies are — and what they ought to be. In this report we present an initial exploration of the ways in which military service is perceived by two groups — a national sample of civilians and a cross-section of Navy personnel. We also explore the ways in which these perceptions are linked to attitudes toward enlistment or reenlistment.

The data for this report were obtained from a questionnaire administered to a sample of Navy units and to a national probability sample of civilians. The questionnaire is included in an appendix to this report. A detailed description of the sampling techniques as well as a description of the fit of the samples to their respective populations is presented in a separate methods report. A summary of these procedures follows.

NAVY SAMPLE

Data from the Navy sample were collected from both ship and shore stations between November 1972 and February 1973. The question-naires were personally administered by the Institute for Social Research personnel.

Ships were included from both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Individuals in the sample were chosen in proportion to the number of personnel assigned to each ship type. For example, if 35 percent of the personnel assigned to ships were aboard destroyers, 35 percent of the individuals in the sample were selected so as to come from destroyers. Ships themselves were chosen largely on the basis of availability, with the specific ship selection occasionally influenced by the logistics of moving Organizational Development Research Program staff from one ship to another. As may be imagined, weather was also an occasional element in determining whether the necessary connections between two selected ships could be made.

For at least two reasons, an effort was made to maximize in the sample as many ships as possible currently deployed away from their home ports. First, larger proportions of the billets are in fact filled on deployed ships than on ships in port. Second, personnel aboard deployed ships are more likely to have had a period of exposure to the organizational variables being measured. For these reasons, more than half of the ships sampled were deployed at the time of the administration of the survey.

Shore stations were included from eight shore station commands (Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Training, Material, Personnel, Medicine and Surgery, Security, and Communications) and from the CNO staff. Individuals in the sample were chosen in proportion to the number of personnel assigned to each command. Specific shore stations were randomly selected from those available in four geographical areas — East Coast, Memphis-Pensacola, San Diego, and Hawaii.

Personnel actually surveyed aboard a particular site were members of intact organizational subunits, consisting of work groups related to one another through supervisors who are, at the same time, a superior of the group they supervise and a subordinate in the group immediately above. In this fashion, one may conceive of the organization as a structure of such overlapping groups, a pyramid of interlaced pyramids. For purposes of identifying and selecting intact units for the study's analytic aims, the sampling basis was designated as a "module," by which is meant a "pyramid" of groups three echelons tall. Thus, members from four adjacent levels were included, with the module head defined as the person at the apex of that particular three-tier pyramid. Yet another criterion for the selection of a module was that the person at the apex (the module head) had been at his current assignment for at least three months.

A list of all personnel at a site who met the criteria for module head was obtained from manpower authorization documents and from organizational charts, and from these rosters an appropriate number of module heads were randomly selected. If a particular module did not provide a large enough sample of personnel required for the particular site, another module head was selected by the same method. Thus, the sample from a site consisted of one or more modules.

This sampling procedure resulted in data collection from 38 different Navy sites in a total sample size of 2522 Navy personnel.

CIVILIAN SAMPLE

The civilian data collection was conducted during February and March of 1973, as part of a larger interview study conducted by the Survey Research Center. The sample included 1327 dwelling units, selected by a multistage sampling system so as to be representative of all dwellings in the conterminous United States exclusive of those on military reservations.

At each housing unit, a trained interviewer from the Survey Research Center conducted an interview with a specifically designated respondent, male or female, age 18 or older. The final segment of the interview consisted of questions related to the all-volunteer force. Following this personal interview, respondents were asked to complete the pencil-and-paper questionnaire. In addition, copies of the questionnaire were administered to a supplementary sample consisting of all other individuals age 16 or older who were present in each household at the time an interview was taken. Interviewers waited until all questionnaires in a household were completed; none were left behind.

The 1327 interviews obtained represent a response rate of 75 percent. About 90 percent of those interviewed also filled out questionnaires. These, plus the supplementary sample (those who were not interviewed but did complete questionnaires), provided a total of about 1855 civilian questionnaires.

An examination of the interview sample and the supplementary sample, reported elsewhere, showed no systematic differences between the two, except for the fact that the supplementary sample included individuals aged 16 and 17. Because of several advantages from a statistical standpoint, we have chosen to treat the civilian interview and supplementary samples as a single, unweighted sample of people age 16 and older throughout the United States.

ANALYSIS PLAN

In the present initial exploration, we examine two most important demographic variables, age and education, looking separately at five analysis groups: civilian men, civilian women, Navy enlisted men in their first tour of duty, enlisted men in their second or later tour, and officers. (The small number of women in the Navy sample

were omitted from these analyses; also omitted from age-related analyses were a few Navy men who fell into categories too small for statistical reliability.)

Our analysis is concentrated on Part C of the questionnaire. An extensive appendix includes tables for virtually all items and indexes from Part C, with mean scores for each of the five analysis groups cross-classified by age.

CHAPTER 2

PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY WORK ROLE

How attractive is a work role in the military services? What are the job opportunities? What are the chances for fair treatment? These are the kinds of questions likely to be asked not only by a young person considering enlistment, but also by his parents, relatives and friends. Thus we will be interested in the perceptions of a whole range of civilian respondents, for their perceptions of the military role -- no matter whether they are accurate or inaccurate -- will have a great deal to do with the viability of an all-volunteer force.

First-term enlisted men represent another group of special interest to us. They have been freshly exposed to the realities of the military work role, and will soon be deciding whether to extend that exposure by reenlisting. How do their perceptions of military service compare with civilians of the same age, and how do they compare with officers and later-term enlisted men?

JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MILITARY SERVICES

A series of five questions ask respondents to rate the extent to which the following opportunities are available to people who work in the military services: C1* "A chance to get ahead," C2 "A chance to get more education," C3 "A chance to advance to a more responsible position," C4 "A chance to have a personally more fulfilling job," C5 "A chance to get their ideas heard." These opportunities are rated on a five-point scale ranging from 1 ("a very little extent") to 5 ("a very great extent"). Mean ratings for each of the items are presented in Figure 1. A number of observations may be based on this figure:

First, we find that Navy enlisted men in their first tours of duty consistently rate each of the five opportunities lower than any

^{*} Cl designates the first question in Part C of the questionnaire. Similar notations will be used throughout this report.

other group, whereas officers and enlisted men in later tours give higher ratings than any other group. Men and women in the civilian sample are nearly identical, on the average, in their rating of military job opportunities.


A second observation, like the first, is based on the total pattern of ratings across the five opportunity dimensions. Each analysis group tends to rank the five dimensions in the same order. While officers and later-term enlisted Navy men give consistently higher ratings of military work opportunities than do first-termers, they all give relatively high scores to educational opportunities and chances to advance to greater responsibility, and they all give lowest mean ratings to chances for getting their ideas heard. The fact that this same patterning also holds for civilians suggests that there is an underlying reality that is being accurately perceived, or at least that there is a stereotype of military job opportunities that is pervasive enough to be held by servicemen as well as civilians. Let us take a closer look at some of the dimensions of military job opportunities.

Highest overall ratings are given to opportunities for getting more education in the military services. The most common response is to rate such opportunities as being available "to a great extent." The military services do offer extensive educational possibilities, both during and following service, and these appear to be widely recognized.

Next highest ratings are given to "a chance to advance to a more responsible position," and "a chance to get ahead." Most civilians and Navy men think such opportunities for advancement exist to at least some extent, and many rate them as available to a great extent.

When we turn to matters of personal fulfillment, the picture becomes somewhat less favorable. Most civilians, plus Naval officers and later-term enlisted men, say that chances to have a personally more fulfilling job exist to at least some extent. But the first-term enlisted men in the Navy show substantially lower mean ratings; as Figure 1 indicates, this group stands in contrast to all the others. The difference remains nearly as strong when we turn to the lowest ranked item, the chance for people working in the services to get their ideas heard. Here again we find that first-term enlisted men give much lower ratings than the other groups; most first-termers see only small opportunities for getting one's ideas heard in the services.

FIGURE 1
Military Job Opportunity Items



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Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Tables 1-5 of the appendix.

AN INDEX OF MILITARY JOB OPPORTUNITIES


The five items discussed above were combined to form an index called "Military Job Opportunities." Figure 2 displays index scores related to age. For civilians there is not a strong association between age and perceived military job opportunities. Those in their teens tend to show higher ratings than those in their twenties, but the effects are not very strong. A similar pattern appears among first-term enlisted men; the relationship is very similar to that for civilian males, except that the scores for each age level are somewhat lower among the Navy first-termers. The strongest relationship between age and perceived military job opportunities is found where we might expect it — among officers and laterterm enlisted men. In both groups there is a strong tendency for older men to rate the military services in more positive terms.*

Of course, there is a very close association between age and length of service in our Navy sample, thus it is also the case that those who have been in service longest take the most positive view of military job opportunities. Separate analyses by length of service show that scores among both officers and enlisted men range from about 3.0 for those with just one or two years of service, to above 4.2 for those with 25 years or more service. This, coupled with the lack of strong age trends among the civilian respondents, suggests that the primary phenomenon involves length of service — those who serve longest in the Navy are also those who see the services in the most positive terms. Whether this reflects selfselection or socialization, or both, remains to be discussed in a later chapter.

Perceived military job opportunities show some systematic relationship with level of education, as indicated in Figure 3. While the effects are not very strong, there is a tendency for those with more education to give somewhat lower ratings to military job opportunities. Given that higher levels of education are generally associated with higher occupational attainments and levels of aspiration, it is understandable that military job opportunities should seem a bit less attractive to the more educated respondents; presumably they apply a somewhat more demanding set of criteria in evaluating job opportunities.

^{*} Essentially the same pattern as shown in Figure 2 was found for each of the five items that comprise the index (see Tables 1-5 in the appendix).

Military Job Opportunity Index Related to Age



Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 55 of the appendix.

PERCEPTIONS OF FAIR TREATMENT IN THE SERVICES

Several questionnaire items are designed to measure perceptions of fair treatment in the services. Item C6 asks: "To what extent is it likely that a person in the military can get things changed and set right if he is being treated unjustly by a superior?" The most common response by first-term Navy enlisted men is "to a little extent;" later-termers and officers most commonly check "to some extent;" civilian men and women fall in between.


Another item, C9, asks: "Do you personally feel that you would receive more just and fair treatment as a civilian or as a member of the military service?" Naval officers and later-term enlisted men show an average response at the midpoint of the scale -- they rank chances for fair treatment as being "about the same" in military or civilian life. First-term enlisted men most often choose the response "more fair as a civilian," and some check the response "much more fair as a civilian." Again, the civilian respondents tend to fall between the first-termers and later-termers -- they show a moderate preference for civilian treatment, on the average.

Age patterns for both of the "fair treatment" items are rather similar to the pattern for job opportunities shown in Figure 2. The strongest age trends involve officers; the greater the age (and length of service), the more positive the feelings about military service. Later-term enlisted men also show a moderately strong relationship between age and feelings about fair treatment in the services. (For more detailed information on age related to items C6 and C9, see Tables 6 and 9 in the appendix.)

PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION IN THE SERVICES

Item C7 asks: "To what extent do you think there is any discrimination against women who are in the armed services?" Mean responses for all groups of respondents lie between the second point on the scale ("to a little extent") and the third point ("to some extent"). Civilian women average only a tiny bit higher than civilian men (less than 8 percent of a standard deviation) in perceptions of sex discrimination, and there are no consistent trends related to age in the civilian sample. Within the Navy sample, officers rate sex discrimination as being a bit more frequent than do enlisted men; among both officers and later-term enlisted men there is a tendency for older men to report somewhat less discrimination.

FIGURE 3
Military Job Opportunity Index Related to Education



*Only 17 later-term enlisted men in the sample were college graduates. This number was considered too small to provide a reliable estimate, thus this category has been excluded from the figure.

Item C8 asks: "To what extent do you think there is any discrimination against black people who are in the armed services?" Here again the mean responses of all groups lie between "a little extent" and "some extent." There are no strong and consistent agerelated trends. Looking separately at white and black Navy respondents, we find the median rating by whites is that discrimination against blacks exists in the services "to a little extent," while the median rating by blacks is that anti-black discrimination exists "to a great extent." At first blush, this might suggest that black Navy men find the military services unattractive. But when we compare black and white Navy enlisted men's ratings of just and fair treatment in military service versus civilian life (item C9, discussed earlier), we find that blacks are more favorable toward military service than are whites. The black enlisted men, on the average, rate chances for fair treatment in the military services as being "about the same" as those in civilian life. In other words, while blacks in the Navy perceive a considerable amount of racial discrimination in the military services, they apparently see it as no worse than the level of discrimination they would be exposed to as civilians.

THOUGHTS ABOUT A SON ENLISTING

One of our central interests involves attitudes, among both civilians and those in the Navy sample, about enlistment in the military service. In order to put the matter in a form that would be applicable to all respondents, we asked the following hypothetical question (C10): "If you had a son in his late teens or early twenties who decided to enter the military service, how would you feel about his decision?" Four response categories were provided: "Strongly positive, Mostly positive, Mostly negative, Strongly negative." A neutral point was deliberately omitted from the response scale because we wished to have respondents "take sides" on this matter. We recognize that there are a variety of reasons why one might either favor or oppose a son's decision to enter the service. Some might make their choice primarily in terms of perceived working conditions in the service, compared to the jobs considered as alternative civilian possibilities. Others might be influenced primarily by their feelings about patriotism and the mission of the military services. Still others might take the view that they would favor whatever vocation a son were to select because the choice ought to be up to the son. In a later chapter we will explore the extent to which these various reasons seem to be dominant in the overall reaction to the idea of a son's enlistment. For the present, we will content ourselves with reporting the basic patterns of response to the item.

In general, the civilian respondents say they would be mostly positive about a son's decision to enlist. Younger men in the civilian sample are somewhat less enthusiastic than older men; those in their early twenties tend to be almost evenly split between the positive and the negative, while those over 35 average "mostly positive" in their responses. (Similar age trends do not appear among the women respondents.)

Officers and later-term enlisted men in the Navy sample seem quite positive about the possibility of a son's enlistment, especially those who are older and have had more years of Navy service. First-term enlisted men, on the other hand, are a good deal less enthusiastic; on the average they are just a bit more negative than positive about the prospects of a son enlisting. (For more detailed information, see Table 10 in the appendix.)

SUMMARY

In this chapter on perceptions of the military work role we have found that Navy men and civilians alike see the services as offering good opportunities for increasing education and for moving into positions of greater responsibility. Chances for getting one's ideas heard and for having "a personally more fulfilling job" are rated less high. When asked about chances for redress when treated unfairly by a superior, most respondents say things would be set right "to some extent" or "to a little extent." And when asked whether they would receive more fair treatment in a military or civilian setting, most respondents rate them the same or favor civilian life. Finally, when asked whether they would feel positive or negative about a son's enlistment in the military service, most respondents tend to be positive.

Along each of these dimensions, Navy officers and later-term enlisted men give higher ratings to military life than do men and women in our civilian sample. On the other hand, the lowest ratings are provided by first-term enlisted men in the Navy. (As we will demonstrate later, the low ratings are attributable to that majority of first-term enlisted men who do not plan to re-enlist in the Navy; those planning to re-enlist appear much more similar to later-term enlisted men.)

In sum, feelings about job characteristics in the military services tend to be a mixture of positive and negative. Moreover, the same things that are rated high by Navy men tend to be rated relatively high by civilians. Perhaps most important are the rather low scores which many first-termers give to military life.

CHAPTER 3

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE ARMED FORCES

How well do the armed forces carry out their mission? A number of questions were asked to ascertain respondents' perceptions of the efficiency and effectiveness of the military services — especially military leadership. Some of the questions were adapted from the "trust in government" items which have been used often by the Survey Research Center; others were developed specifically for this study.

PERCEIVED QUALITY OF MILITARY LEADERS

Perhaps the most general question about the competence of military leaders is C24: "To what extent do you think you can trust our military leadership to do what is right?" Responses to this question are displayed in Figure 4. As the figure indicates, there are age-related trends among men in both the Navy and civilian life; average scores for men in their early twenties fall below point "3" on the response scale (with "3" indicating trust in military leadership "to some extent"), while for men in their thirties or forties or older — especially those in the Navy — the average scores approach point "4" on the scale (indicating trust "to a great extent"). Among civilian women there are few age-related differences; average scores for all ages tend to fall midway between points "3" and "4".

Just as we found in the case of military job opportunities (see Figure 2), so also for trust in military leadership we find that first-term enlisted men in the Navy are less positive than later-termers and officers. In the present instance, however, we find that the stronger trends relate to age rather than status in the service. Moreover, the age trends for civilian men are very close to those for the Navy respondents. While the patterns are not identical, they are sufficiently similar to support the conclusion that attitudes of trust in military leadership among men in the United States are somewhat different from one generation to another, and this holds whether the men are in the Navy or in civilian life.

Several other questions produce essentially similar responses. Question C19 asks: "To what extent do you think our military leaders are smart people who know what they are doing?" Responses average very slightly lower than the responses to item C24 shown in Figure 4, but the overall patterning of age-related trends is the same — trust is below average among those men in their early twenties and above average among those in their late thirties and older. (See Table 19 in the appendix for more detailed information.)

Very similar trends are also in evidence for question C23: "To what extent do you think military officers try to do as good a job as they can?" The responses to this question, displayed in Figure 5, show an interesting — if not surprising — departure from responses to the other questions: Navy officers are particularly likely to say that military officers try to do a good job "to a great extent." The rest of the Navy respondents are nearly identical, on the average, to their age-mates among civilian men; the only exception is a tendency for civilian males in their late teens to be more favorable than Navy enlisted men the same age.*


PERCEIVED WASTE IN MILITARY SPENDING

Two items are specifically related to the efficient use of money by the military services. Item C18 asks: "To what extent do you think the military makes efficient use of the money in its budget?" Item C22 states the issue in more negative terms: "To what extent is there waste in the way our military services are run at present?"

Responses to item C20 are detailed in Table 20 of the appendix. In general, enlisted men see the greatest possibilities for improving the caliber of military officers, whereas Navy officers 35 and older rate the possibilities somewhat lower.

^{*} One additional item (C20) deals with military leadership: "To what extent would it be possible to improve the caliber of our officer ranks?" This item shows very poor correlations with other items in this section, perhaps because the dimension of evaluation is less clear and straightforward than for the other items. Someone wishing to express criticism of military officers might say that the caliber of officers could (should) be improved "to a great extent." On the other hand, it does not follow that all who give such a response intend to express criticism —some may simply be indicating that improvement is always possible.

FIGURE 4



112

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Based on Item C24: "To what extent do you think you can trust our military leadership to do what is right?"

Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 24 of the appendix.

(There is, of course, an inverse relationship between the two items; the product-moment correlation for both Navy and civilian samples is -.39.) The responses to both items (presented in detail in Tables 18 and 22 in the appendix) tell essentially the same story -- Navy men and civilians alike think there is efficient use of money "to a little extent" or "to some extent," and they perceive waste as existing "to some extent" or "to a great extent." Here, as we found earlier, the most critical responses come from young men in their twenties. There are no substantial differences between Navy officers and enlisted men of the same ages, but there is a slight tendency for Navy men in general to perceive more military waste than do civilian men in the same age brackets. Civilian women's responses to these questions, like their answers to other questions noted above, do not show as strong or consistent age-related trends as do the men's. In particular, women in their twenties are a good deal less critical than their male counterparts.


MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

It is one thing to criticize the quality of military leadership or the extent of waste in the military services; it is quite another matter to criticize the level of our military preparedness. Some who are critical of waste in the military also feel that we already have adequate -- perhaps more than adequate -- military capability. Others who may be quite positive about the quality of military leadership still argue that we fall short of the military preparedness needed in today's world. Still others, of course, are consistently positive or consistently negative in all of these evaluations.

Two questionnaire items are addressed to the issue of preparedness. Question C17 asks: "To what extent do you think our armed forces are capable of meeting all of our present military needs?" In general, responses of Navy men average midway between "to some extent" and "to a great extent." Civilian respondents tend to give higher ratings to our military capabilities -- most think our armed forces are capable of meeting present needs "to a great extent."

Question C21 puts the issue of preparedness in negative terms: "To what extent do we fall short of the military preparedness we need in today's world?" Here the Navy responses average close to "some extent," while civilian responses average about midway between "a little extent" and "some extent."

FIGURE 5
Officers Try to Do Well Related to Age



Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 23 of the appendix.

Age-related trends are not very strong or consistent for either of these items, nor are there substantial differences between Navy groups (see Tables 17 and 21 in the appendix for details). The most consistent finding is that Navy men are a bit less sure about our preparedness than are civilians; but on the whole the responses suggest a good deal of confidence that our armed forces are capable of meeting our needs.

SUMMARY

In their evaluations of the competence of military leaders, and of waste in the military services, young men in their twenties are especially critical -- and this holds true for both those in the Navy and those in civilian life. Older men do not voice such strong criticisms, nor do civilian women of all ages.

Ratings of military preparedness indicate a fairly high level of confidence, especially among civilians, that our armed forces are able to meet our needs.

An analysis of educational levels related to an overall index of confidence in military leadership (based on all eight items discussed in this chapter) shows only very modest trends. Those with college degrees average about two-tenths of a scale point (one-third of a standard deviation for the index) lower in their confidence ratings than those with a high school education or less. This matches our finding in the earlier section that more educated respondents are a bit less positive in their evaluations of military job opportunities.

CHAPTER 4

MILITARY INFLUENCE OVER NATIONAL POLICY

A study of people's values, preferences and perceptions concerning military service would hardly be complete without some questions about the impact of the military establishment on the larger society, and particularly on our national policy. Our questionnaire includes a number of items which deal with these issues at several levels. Some are very broad and general, while others sample a few more specific dimensions. Some questions have to do with perceptions of the way things are, and others have to do with the way our respondents think things ought to be.

OVERALL APPRAISALS OF COST AND INFLUENCE

Two questions ask the respondent to evaluate the armed services in terms of military influence and military spending. Item C25 asks: "All things considered, do you think the armed services presently have too much or too little influence on the way this country is run?" Item C26 asks: "Do you think the U.S. spends too much or too little on the armed services?" Response categories for both items range from (1) "Far too much," through (3) "About right," to (5) "Far too little." Responses to the two items show a strong positive relationship (the product-moment correlations are .47 for the civilian sample, .46 for the Navy sample), and patterns by age and sub-sample are quite similar.

Views on military spending are summarized in Figure 6. Average responses for civilians fall about midway between the statement that we are spending "too much" and the statement that the spending is "about right." Once again we find stronger age trends for civilian men than for women; young men in their twenties tend to be most critical of levels of military spending. First-term enlisted men in the Navy rate military spending levels as "about right" on the average, but there is some variation by age; those in their mid-or late twenties tend toward a bit less spending, while those in their late teens or early twenties prefer a bit more. Later-term enlisted men tend to think that our present levels of spending are "about right" or else that we spend "too little."
Naval officers rate spending levels as "about right," on the average, with older officers showing some preference for greater military spending.


The ratings of military influence, as we noted earlier, show age trends similar to those displayed in Figure 6, although the relationships are not quite as strong (see Table 25 in the appendix for details). Most respondents think the level of armed services influence over the way the country is run is "about right." But many young civilian men think there is "too much" military influence, whereas among later-term enlisted men and older officers in the Navy there is a tendency to say there is "too little" military influence. In the next section we will have a much clearer look at these different views about military versus civilian influence.

One other question puts the matter of military impact on society in the most general — and perhaps the most simplistic — terms. Item C27 asks: "Overall, how do you feel about the role of the military services in our society during the time since World War II — has it been mostly positive or mostly negative?"* The most frequent response is "mostly positive," although a fair proportion of respondents — especially among young civilian men and first-term Navy enlistees — see the recent role of the military services as having been "mostly negative." (For more detailed information, see Table 27 in the appendix.)

MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN INFLUENCE

Who should have more influence in major decisions affecting national security -- civilian leaders or military leaders? This issue is the topic of five pairs of questions (C28 through C37), with each pair asking the respondent first to check "This is how I think it is now," and then check "This is how I'd like it to be." Response categories range from (1) "Civilians much more" through (3) "About equal influence" to (5) "Military much more." The question topics

^{*} This question is probably difficult for some respondents because it is stated in such a broad and non-specific form. Our purpose in asking it is to see whether such global evaluations have any special utility as predictors of actions or other attitudes. We will need to wait for other much more extensive analyses before reaching any conclusions about this item; present indications, however, suggest that the other more specific items will prove more useful in analyses.



Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 26 of the appendix. Based on item C26: Do you think the U.S. spends too much or too little on the armed services?

range from "what tactics to use on the battlefield" to "whether to use nuclear weapons." Figure 7 shows, for each of our analysis groups, the actual ("how I think it is now") and ideal ("how I'd like it to be") ratings for five decision areas. An examination of Figure 7 leads to a number of comments and conclusions:

- 1. Note that both the actual and ideal influence ratings are in nearly the same order for each set of respondents—the three categories of Navy men plus civilian men and civilian women. (The sequence in which the items are presented in the figure reflects this order; it is not the sequence in which the questions were asked.) All groups agree that the battlefield tactics area is and should be the area of greatest military influence (among those listed), and the areas of greatest civilian influence are seen to be decisions about foreign involvements and the use of nuclear weapons.
- 2. When we examine the patterns of responses for the several subgroups we find that Navy officers show considerable differentiation in their ratings of the five areas. This shows up to some extent in their ratings of the way things are, but it is especially strong in their statements about the way they would like things to be. On the one hand, they think there should be a good deal more military than civilian influence over choice of battlefield tactics; however, their responses here are not sharply different from the preferences expressed by enlisted men or, for that matter, by civilians. On the other hand, when it comes to ideal influence over foreign involvements and the use of nuclear weapons, they place a far greater emphasis on civilian decision-making than any other group of respondents.

No doubt Navy officers have had occasion to give these matters much more thought and study than either enlisted men or the average civilian. The result is that they are more discriminating in their ratings, and also far more willing to grant decision-making priorities to civilians in the areas that are traditionally "civilian."

3. Civilians show a less differentiated response pattern than the Navy officers. Perhaps more significant, they show — on the average, at least — a great deal of satisfaction with the status quo as they perceive it. Their ratings of actual and ideal influence are virtually identical. They think that military leaders presently have somewhat more influence over tactics; and they think that this is exactly the way things ought to be. When it comes to such matters as military pay, foreign involvements, and the use of nuclear weapons,

most civilians think that military and civilian leaders are about equal in influence; and once again they seem to think this is the way things ought to be.


The tendency of civilians to be satisfied with the status quo is certainly consistent with our finding, reported above, that the typical civilian respondent says the level of armed services influence over the way the country is run is "about right." Nevertheless, it is a bit startling to find civilians so willing to see equal military and civilian influence over the involvement of troops in foreign conflicts or the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, the civilian satisfaction with the status quo applies only on the average; as we shall shortly note, there are important age-related differences in viewpoints about military versus civilian influences.

4. If the civilians seem on the average to be satisfied with the status quo, the career men in the Navy most surely are not. If we take seriously the differences between the ratings of how things are and the ratings of how things ought to be, then we must conclude that there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the status quo among Navy officers and especially among later-term enlisted men. The preferred levels of influence for later-term enlisted men are somewhat different from those for civilians; but far more dramatic are the differences in their perceptions of the way things presently are. Career men in the Navy -- both officers and enlisted men -- tend to see military leaders as much less influential than civilian leaders, and this stands in marked contrast to the perceptions of our civilian respondents.


One way of viewing these differences between actual and ideal levels of influence is to say that career men in the Navy (and probably in other branches of military service as well) tend to feel relatively powerless as a group over decisions that vitally affect their lives. They think the decisions are made mostly by civilians rather than by their own leaders.

An alternative perspective is to note that these career military men think there should be a substantial increase in military influence all across the range of decision-making from battlefield tactics to the use of nuclear weapons. Some critics of an all-volunteer military force have argued that its heavier reliance on career men would encourage a "separate military ethos," and thus constitute a political threat. Certainly these differences between actual and ideal influence, which are especially strong among later-term enlisted men, can hardly be reassuring to such critics.

Views on Military Versus Civilian Influence -- Actual and Ideal



Level of Influence





5. Among first-term enlisted men in the Navy the differences between actual and ideal levels of influence are much smaller. What they consider to be ideal is not very different from the preferences of later-term enlisted men. On the other hand, their ratings of the current reality differ substantially from the ratings by career men—both officers and later-term enlisted men. The result is that first-term enlisted men in the Navy show only moderate dissatisfaction with the status quo, and in many respects they appear not very different from the average civilian. But this appearance is a bit deceptive; when we focus specifically on the younger civilian men— the ones who are the age-mates of the first-term enlisted men— we find that they would prefer somewhat less military influence than they perceive now exists.

Before turning to age-related differences in these perceptions and preferences, let us speculate a moment about the different responses of the several Navy groups. Why is it that officers and later-term enlisted men give ratings of actual influence that are so different from those given by first-term enlisted men? Is it because the relatively inexperienced first-term enlisted men. like the civilian respondents, are simply unrealistic about the actual levels of military versus civilian influence? Or does it mean that the career men are in some degree "paranoid" about what they perceive as the inadequate levels of military influence? To put the matter another way, should we conceive of the ratings of actual influence as more-or-less dispassionate reports of the way things are, or should we view them primarily as attitudinal measures -- indicators of dissatisfaction and a sense of relative powerlessness among some military men? We raise these questions here without yet feeling certain about the answer, but early correlational analyses suggest that Navy men's ratings of actual influence do indeed "look like" attitudinal measures. We will have a bit more to say about this in a later chapter; for the present we must assume that the Navy ratings of actual influence are, at least in part, an indirect indication of dissatisfaction with current levels of military versus civilian influence.

Each of the five areas of military versus civilian influence discussed above were analyzed to discover age-related patterns. In general, the patterns were very similar from one item to another (see Tables 28 through 37 in the appendix for details). A summary of the findings can be seen in Figure 8, which displays the age patterns for an index of actual influence (based on items C28, C30, C32, C34, and C36) and an index of ideal influence (based on items C29, C31, C33, C35, and C37). This figure, like the preceding one, leads to a number of comments and conclusions:

FIGURE 8





- 1. Among all groups of respondents there is a tendency for higher age levels to perceive the military as having relatively less actual influence. The pattern is particularly strong among first-term Navy enlisted men.
- 2. Age shows little relationship to preferred or ideal levels of military versus civilian influence. First-term enlisted men are an exception; the younger ones prefer more military influence than the older ones.
- 3. As we noted earlier, there is a substantial discrepancy between actual and ideal levels of influence for Navy officers and especially for later-term enlisted men. In both instances, the discrepancy is larger among the older career men.
- 4. Among civilians, both men and women, there is a tendency for those in their twenties and younger to desire somewhat less military influence than they perceive presently exists. Among the older respondents the reverse is true to some extent. The differences lie less in the way people think things ought to be, and more in the way they feel things presently are.
- 5. When we compare Navy respondents with their male civilian age-mates, we see that the Navy men consistently give lower ratings to actual military influence. Enlisted men show somewhat higher preferred levels of military influence than their civilian age-mates, but the same is not true for officers.

We examined the data to see whether views on actual and ideal military versus civilian influence show a relationship with educational levels. The effects are mostly quite small. The perceptions of actual influence show no consistent relationship to educational levels. On the other hand, we do find a general tendency for better educated individuals to prefer somewhat less military influence. The difference amounts to one-half to two-thirds of a standard deviation (.4 to .6 scale points) between college graduates and those with a high school education or less. College educated civilians prefer slightly more civilian than military influence, averaged across the five areas we examined; the reverse is true for those with a high school education or less. Among first-term enlisted men, the college graduates prefer that military and civilian influence be about the same, on the average; those with no further education than high school would

like to see greater military influence. Educational differences exist also among later-term enlisted men; among officers, eighty percent of whom are college graduates, the differences are trivial (but in the same direction).

SUMMARY

If there is any group which feels that military influence is excessive, it is the group of young civilian men in their twenties — especially the better educated. But their dissatisfaction is only moderate when compared with the reverse sort of discontent expressed by career enlisted men in the Navy, who feel that military influence is a great deal <u>lower</u> than it ought to be. The same sorts of feelings are expressed to a moderate degree by Navy officers, and to a lesser degree by first-term enlisted men.

But while there are some differences in viewpoints, as noted above, there are also broad areas of agreement. All groups of respondents agree that some areas of decision-making (e.g., choice of battlefield tactics) should be influenced primarily by military leaders, and most think that this is the way things presently are. Other areas, such as decisions to commit troops to foreign conflicts or to use nuclear weapons, are seen as the domain of civilian leaders to a considerable degree. Interestingly enough, the importance of civilian leadership in the latter areas is stressed to a far greater degree by Navy officers than by the civilian respondents.

CHAPTER 5

FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY POWER

In the preceding chapter we concentrated on the degree to which national policy is felt to be influenced by military leaders. Now we turn to a somewhat broader topic — United States foreign policy and particularly policy about the uses of military power. Here, as in the preceding section, we are concerned with perceptions of the way things are, and preferences about the way things ought to be.

We feel compelled at the outset to add a cautionary note about the types of questions that will be presented in this chapter and the following one. We will be reporting items with an Agree-Disagree format. (The scale includes Agree, Agree mostly, Disagree mostly, Disagree.) Items of this sort have to be kept rather simple in form, and the danger of oversimplification is a very real concern to us. We have sometimes included more than one question on the same or very similar topics, in order to be able to state things in varying shades of attractiveness or to try to counteract an "agreement bias." (This refers to a tendency by some respondents to agree with any statement that "sounds reasonable" — especially in areas which they have not thought through very carefully.) We think the usefulness of agree-disagree items is greatest when they are considered in groups rather than as isolated items, and when they are used to highlight patterns and relationships. (The emphasis on relational analyses will be greater in our later reports.)

WHEN IS WAR JUSTIFIED?

Most people would agree that the most fundamental reason for going to war would be to defend against an attack on one's own country, and many would add that a strong military force is an effective deterrent to such an attack. But is this the only reason for maintaining a large military establishment?

The last decade has seen a massive U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia which could scarcely be treated as defense against attack on the U.S.; rather, it has been justified as an effort to protect the rights of our allies, and sometimes also as a protection of our "vital interests." Whatever the justification, the terrible costs in terms of death, human suffering, and the consumption of resources have been all

too familiar. Many observers feel that another cost of the war has been the tarnished image of the U.S. military establishment and its mission. Now, in the sober aftermath of our Vietnam involvement, it is important to ask what conditions the American people think would justify war. And it is also of great interest to ask the same questions of a sample of military men.

One way of stating the issue is presented in question C41: "The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on our own country." The most common response to that question among civilian men and women is "agree mostly," and the same is true for first-term Navy enlisted men. Among officers and later-term enlisted men, those in their earlier twenties tend mostly to agree while those in their thirties and forties tend mostly to disagree (see the appendix for details on this item and others).

But if many agree that defense against attack is "the only good reason" to go to war, there are also quite a few who agree with the statement in question C39: "There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries." Civilian men and women show mixed agreement and disagreement with this statement, as do first-term enlisted men in the Navy. Later-term enlisted men and officers tend mostly to agree, with levels of agreement highest among those of greater age and length of service.

There are higher levels of agreement with the statement presented in item C40: "The U.S. should be willing to go to war to protect its own economic interests." The most common response to this statement by all categories of respondents is "mostly agree." Do people think that our present policies are dominated by such considerations? Item C44 states the matter in rather unattractive terms: "Our present foreign policy is based on our own narrow economic and power interests." Among civilians there is more agreement than disagreement with this statement, and the agreement is especially strong among young men in their twenties. First-term Navy enlisted men also tend to agree mostly; later-termers and officers present a mixed picture, with greater agreement among younger men and greater disagreement among older ones.

In sum, our civilian respondents seem to be saying that defense against attack would be the best reason for going to war; however, many seem willing to justify war to protect the rights of other countries, and most would consider going to war to protect U.S. economic interests. Young men in their twenties express least willingness to go to war for other countries or for U.S. economic interests, whereas Naval officers and later-term enlisted men seem somewhat more willing than civilians to consider going to war for these reasons.

THE ARMS RACE

One of the reasons for the very large scale of U.S. military expenditures has been the feeling that we should stay ahead of other countries, especially the Soviet Union. Three questions are related to this issue and express various shades of opinion.

Perhaps the most extreme question, at least if one judges from the extent of strong disagreement it evokes, is C38: "The U.S. should begin a gradual program of disarming whether other countries do or not." Civilian men and women check "disagree mostly" on the average. Navy enlisted men in their first term also tend most often to "disagree mostly," but among later-termers and officers the most frequent response is an unqualified "disagree." Opposition to unilateral disarmament is strongest among Navy men who are oldest (and have served longest).

Another item which evokes disagreement is C42: "The U.S. does not need to have greater military power than the Soviet Union." The most typical response among all groups of respondents is "mostly disagree." Disagreement is especially strong among later-term Navy enlisted men, and it is least strong among that now familiar group of civilian men in their twenties.

A strong statement in favor of U.S. military superiority is presented in item C43: "The U.S. ought to have much more military power than any other nation in the world." Civilian men and women tend to agree mostly, although a considerable minority express disagreement. Interestingly enough, there is less endorsement of U.S. military superiority among Navy first-term enlisted men and officers — especially the younger officers. For these groups the responses are evenly balanced between agreement and disagreement. The average score for later-term enlisted men is "agree mostly."

In sum, the dominant sentiment would seem to favor some degree of military superiority on the part of the U.S., but perhaps not a great deal more than any other nation. One of the interesting issues to be explored later is whether attitudes on this issue, and the previous ones, are related to feelings about serving in the armed forces.

THE VIETNAM WAR

We noted earlier that our decade of involvement in Southeast Asia has no doubt been an important -- perhaps the dominant -- factor in shaping recent attitudes toward the military services and their role in international policy. A series of questionnaire items dealing with

Vietnam have been analyzed separately and also combined in an index of "Vietnam Dissent." An overview of the findings is presented in Table 1, and the relationships with age are summarized in Figure 9.

A brief overview of the mean scores for each item shows that respondents tend to "agree mostly" that fighting the war in Vietnam has been damaging to our national honor or pride and has not really been in the national interest. Agreement is stronger among civilian men in their twenties and first-term Navy enlisted men; the highest levels of agreement are found among young Navy officers.

There is also a good deal of agreement with the more "positive" statements that our fighting in Vietnam has been important to fight the spread of Communism, to protect friendly countries, and to show other nations that we keep our promises. Most categories of respondents show more agreement than disagreement with these statements. Among young men in their twenties, however, the tendencies to disagree are stronger. This is true for civilians and especially for Navy officers; the disagreement is a bit less strong among Navy enlisted men, particularly later-termers.

Figure 9 summarizes the age trends we have been noting. It is interesting to observe that first-term enlisted men and officers in the Navy are not very different from their male civilian age-mates, on the average. The older officers tend to defend our Vietnam involvement to a greater degree than civilian men (or women) of the same age, but the younger officers are among the most severe critics.* Later-term enlisted men are the strongest defenders of Vietnam policy, a position that seems fairly consistent with their views on the other issues we have examined.

The relationship between education and dissent over Vietnam policy is shown in Figure 10. The pattern is simple and straightforward — the higher the level of education, the greater the dissatisfaction with past U.S. policy in Vietnam.

One of the surprises contained in our data is the fact that civilian women on the average seem a bit less critical of Vietnam policy than civilian men. This difference is due entirely to the fact that young men in their twenties are particularly critical of Vietnam policy, whereas women of all ages show pretty much the same average levels of criticism (see Figure 9). Nevertheless, the finding is not what we expected,

^{*} It should be noted that the great majority of these young officers are college graduates, and college educated individuals show greater than average criticism of Vietnam policy (as we show in Figure 10 below). If, in our later analyses, we look specifically at civilian college graduates in their twenties, we may well find that their levels of dissatisfaction with Vietnam policy are fully as high as those of young officers.

TABLE 1
Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War


Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

			Mean	Scores	3	
		Enlisted Men/lst term	Enlisted Men/later term	Officers	Civilian Men	Civilian Women
C45.*	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been damag- ing to our national honor or pride.	2.03	2.37	1.86	2.18	2.33
C46.*	Fighting the war in Vietnam has not really been in the national interest.	2.17	2.60	2.26	2.14	2.25
C47.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to fight the spread of Communism.	2.35	1.94	2.52	2.22	2.20
C48.*	Fighting the war in Vietnam has brought us closer to world war.	2.33	2.81	3.04	2.63	2.51
C49.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to protect friendly countries.	2.51	2.00	2.44	2.34	2.37
C50.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to show other nations that we keep our promises.	2.50	1.95	2.27	2.26	2.18
	Vietnam Dissent Index	2.64	2.19	2.52	2.48	2.45


Note: Data supporting this table appear in Tables 45-50 and 66 in the appendix.

*These items were reversed in the construction of the index; formula for the index = mean of items. The response scale for the items is: l=Agree, 2=Agree Mostly, 3=Disagree Mostly, 4=Disagree. Subgroup standard deviations range from .9 to 1.1 for the individual items and is about .7 for the index.

FIGURE 9
Vietnam Dissent Index Related to Age



Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 66 of the appendix.



113 514

*Only 17 later-term enlisted men in the sample were college graduates. This number was considered too small to provide a reliable estimate, thus this category has been excluded from the figure.

Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 69 of the appendix.

given the national opinion polls which in recent years showed that women were more eager than men to end our involvement in Vietnam.

Some might argue that a portion of this criticism by young men is based on a dissatisfaction with the way in which our Vietnam involvement ended -- a feeling that somehow the U.S. should have "won." This might account for part of the criticism among young Navy officers, but it does not square very well with the total set of our findings for civilians. The pattern has been rather consistent across a wide range of items: compared with women the same age, civilian men in their twenties are more critical of military leadership, influence, and spending; more importantly, they are not quite so willing to use war as a means of protecting our economic interests or protecting the rights of other countries, and they see less need to have much more military power than any other nation in the world. They are not best described as anti-military; for the most part they are fairly supportive of a strong military posture, and few support the idea of gradual unilateral disarmament. But there is no escaping the fact that these are the men who came of age during the Vietnam conflict and were likely to perceive its dangers and disadvantages in the most personal terms; perhaps because of this they show the greatest degree of caution about such involvements in the future, and their caution extends to the military establishment in general.

SUMMARY

When reacting to several possible reasons for going to war, our respondents seem to be saying that defense against attack would provide the best justification; but many also seem willing to justify war to protect the rights of other countries, and most would consider going to war to protect U.S. economic interests.

Feelings about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam are mixed. On the one hand there is mostly agreement with statements that the war has damaged our national honor or pride and has not really been in our national interest. On the other hand there is also a good deal of agreement that the war was important to fight the spread of Communism, protect friendly countries, and show other nations that we keep our promises.

The patterns of differences among groups and age categories of respondents are consistent with those reported in earlier chapters. Civilian men in their twenties are especially critical of the Vietnam war, and they are also most cautious about future foreign involvements for any reasons except an attack on the United States. First-term Navy enlisted men are more cautious about military actions than are later-termers, and the first-termers are also more critical of past Vietnam policy. The highest levels of criticism about Vietnam are voiced by young Navy officers.

CHAPTER 6

ISSUES INVOLVED IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

In the years of debate which preceded the establishment of (or return to) an all-volunteer force, a number of problems or objections were raised. Some questions were concerned with costs. others had to do with whether a sufficient number of volunteers could be obtained, and perhaps the most profound set of issues centered around the societal and political impact of moving to an all-volunteer force. We noted earlier the concern about a "separate military ethos" -- a professional military force made up of career men rather than "citizen soldiers." Such issues and problems have been discussed at length elsewhere (see especially Tax, 1967; United States President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970) and we have dealt with them also in some of our previous research (Bachman and Johnston, 1972; Johnston and Bachman, 1972). One of our purposes in the present study has been to tap levels of public awareness and concern over some of these issues, and then to see whether different positions on these issues are related to different attitudes about the military services in general.

The data collected from civilians include a brief interview segment, administered prior to the self-completed questionnaire, which addresses a few of the issues involved in an all-volunteer force. The opening question in this segment asks about support for the general concept of the all-volunteer force: "Some people think we should get rid of the military draft and use all volunteers to staff our armed forces, but others think we should continue to use the draft. Which do you favor?" The all-volunteer force is favored by 57 percent of our civilian respondents, while 31 percent say they would prefer to continue the draft. (The remainder give other opinions or say they do not know.) Thus, as of early 1973, it appears that a clear majority of the civilian population in the United States is in favor of the all-volunteer force. Now let us turn to some implications of that position.

HIGHER PAY LEVELS

A follow-up question to the one about the all-volunteer force versus the draft asks whether respondents see any advantages and disadvantages in an all-volunteer force. Only five percent specifically

mention additional costs for taxpayers or the government as a potential problem.

The next question in the interview sequence deals directly with higher pay levels in the services: "The armed forces are now offering higher pay to servicemen in order to get more people to enlist. Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?" An overwhelming 83 percent consider it a good idea, and only eight percent consider it a poor one. When asked to mention possible disadvantages of the higher pay, 19 percent make the fairly obvious reference to the higher costs; on the other hand, fully 65 percent offer no disadvantages. When asked about possible advantages, 39 percent mention the likelihood of attracting more people, 16 percent think that higher pay levels could attract individuals with higher levels of ability, and 28 percent offer the opinion that military personnel need and/or deserve more money.

One item in the self-completed questionnaire is also addressed to the question of military pay, and offers an opportunity to compare civilian and Navy responses. Item Cll asks whether respondents agree or disagree with the following statement: "The United States should provide high enough salaries and benefits so that it can man its armed forces with volunteers." By far the majority of civilian respondents say they agree or agree mostly with the statement. Not surprisingly, the levels of agreement are even stronger among Navy personnel, especially enlisted men (see Table 11 in the appendix for details).

In sum, there appears to be overwhelming support for the higher military pay levels considered necessary under a volunteer system. A few voice concerns about higher taxes or levels of government expenditure, but they represent a small minority; moreover, a considerable portion of those who mention the cost problems are nevertheless in favor of the higher pay rates.

TYPES OF PERSONNEL

Critics who have expressed the most serious reservations about the all-volunteer force are not concerned about levels of pay; rather they are concerned about the types of individuals that would be attracted to the armed forces, and the type of "professional military establishment" that might develop. A number of questionnaire items are addressed to these kinds of issues, including the distinction between "citizen soldiers" and "career military men," the question of different viewpoints among servicemen, and even the possibility of a military takeover in the United States.

The distinction between "citizen soldiers" and "career men" is clearly drawn in a pair of questionnaire items. Item Cl2 states: "Most of our servicemen should be 'citizen soldiers' -- men who spend just three or four years in the service." Civilian respondents tend to agree more than disagree with this statement, as also do first-term enlisted men in the Navy. Officers and later-term enlisted men, as we might expect, tend mostly to disagree with the statement. A companion item, Cl3, presents the other side of the issue: "Our military service should be staffed mostly with 'career men' who spend twenty or more years in the service." This item seems redundant with the previous one, and indeed it is. Nevertheless, there is only very limited consistency in responses to the two items. (The product-moment correlation between the items is only -.22 among civilians; it is -.31 for the Navy sample.) Civilian men and women, as well as first-term Navy enlisted men, are about evenly divided between those tending to agree and disagree. Career Navy men are more likely to agree. (See Tables 12 and 13 in the appendix for details on these items.)

Two other items are addressed to the matter of a "separate military ethos" or the idea that military men might tend toward some common political point of view. Item C15 states the case for a variety of viewpoints: "There ought to be a wide range of different political viewpoints among those in the military service." The typical response is "agree mostly." Item Cl4 states a different (if not opposite) view: "Only those who agree with our military policy should be allowed to serve in the armed forces." There is slightly more disagreement than agreement with this statement; but opinions are more mixed than might have been expected, given the responses to C15. (See Tables 14 and 15 in the appendix for details on these items.) Perhaps some respondents feel that military men could all agree with military policy and still show a wide range of different political viewpoints. (The two items show product-moment correlations of -.07 and -.14 for the civilian and Navy samples, respectively.)

An index based on items C14 and C15 (constructed prior to discovering the low correlation between them) shows a moderate and very consistent relationship to education. The higher the level of education, the greater the support for a variety of different viewpoints. It is of interest in this connection to note that Navy officers, most of whom are college graduates, show greatest average support for a wide range of political viewpoints (C15) and lowest support for requiring everyone in the service to agree with military policy (C14).

MILITARY OBEDIENCE


An issue closely related to the ones just discussed is that of military obedience. The My Lai massacre brought the issue into sharp focus, and raised the question of when servicemen should properly refuse to obey an order. Several of our questionnaire items, adapted from the work of Kelman and Lawrence (1972), are based explicitly upon the My Lai events. Our findings, like those of Kelman and Lawrence, are rather unsettling.

First, let us consider item C53, which states the matter of obedience in abstract but extremely simple terms: "Servicemen should obey orders without question." The results are summarized in Figure 11. The majority of civilians agree or agree mostly with this item, but this is not true for those in their twenties. Navy men in their second or later enlistment also tend mostly to agree, while those in their first terms show a stronger tendency to disagree. Officers agree with this item for the most part: however, we shall see that their reaction is quite different when faced with a specific (and rather extreme) example of disobedience.

Before introducing our own data, we offer as background a major set of findings from a study by Kelman and Lawrence (1972). The Kelman and Lawrence study interviewed a national sample of 989 respondents in late May and early June of 1971, about two months after the conviction of Lt. William Calley for his actions in the My Lai massacre. The questions of interest to us were worded: "What would most people do if ordered to shoot all inhabitants of a Vietnamese village suspected of aiding the enemy, including old men, women and children?" and "What would you do in this situation?" In answer to the first question, fully 67 percent of the sample thought that most people would follow orders and shoot; 19 percent thought most people would refuse, and an additional 14 percent gave other answers or no opinion. Perhaps more shocking are the answers to the second question: 51 percent thought they themselves would follow orders and shoot, 33 percent thought they would refuse, and 16 percent gave other responses. The authors offered the following comment:

This last finding is surprising only if we assume that "refuse to shoot" is clearly the socially desirable response to give to this question. Since it was a hypothetical question, it would have been easy enough for respondents to give themselves the benefit of the doubt and to say that they would refuse to shoot. But the important point --- perhaps the most important point

FIGURE 11



Based on Item C53: Servicemen should obey orders without question. Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 53 of the appendix.

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in the present study -- is that for many people it is not at all clear that this is the socially desirable response. Rather, they feel that the desirable response in this situation is to follow orders. Thus, the 51 percent of our respondents who say that they would "follow orders and shoot" are not necessarily admitting to moral weakness; for many of them, in fact, this response represents what they would view as their moral obligation. (Kelman and Lawrence, 1972, p. 194).

The Kelman and Lawrence findings seem very relevant to our present research into attitudes about military policy, and especially our concern with the kinds of individuals who might be attracted to an all-volunteer force. Because of this, a modified version of the questions reviewed above was included in our questionnaire.

The questions, along with response distributions, are presented in Table 2. The sequence of items was designed to give respondents a chance to express themselves clearly and without feeling forced to make a firm choice if unable to do so. Note that the first question fills a gap in the original Kelman and Lawrence sequence by asking the respondents to state what soldiers should do if ordered to shoot old men, women and children. The second and third questions follow Kelman and Lawrence closely: respondents are asked what they think most people would do, and then are asked "What do you think you would do in this situation?"

The responses to these questions, summarized in Table 2, present a picture that differs somewhat from the findings of Kelman and Lawrence. Among civilian men and women, the proportions saying they would refuse to shoot are 39 percent and 44 percent, figures that are a bit higher than the 33 percent that Kelman and Lawrence found would refuse to shoot. But much more important are the differences in those who say they would follow orders and shoot; while the earlier study found 51 percent in this category, our own figure for civilian men is 29 percent, and for women it is a very low 13 percent. Does this reflect differences in methodology, many of which were unavoidable? Or does it show a shift in national opinion over a two-year period? Given the direction of the change, it is tempting to attribute it entirely to a shift in national views on proper military conduct; however, there is some likelihood that the question format, including the oft-chosen "Don't know" category, played some role in the shift. Nonetheless, we think that the format is a fairly reasonable one, and we suspect that the findings reflect a real shift in attitudes away from what might have been partly a "sympathy vote" for Lt. Calley two years earlier.

Views on Obedience

		Navy Sample (men only)		Civilian Sample		
54.	Suppose a group of soldiers in Vietnam were ordered by their superior officers to shoot all inhabitants of a village suspected of aiding the enemy including old men, women and children? In your opinion, what should the soldiers do in such a situation?	term	later- term)(N=829)	offi- cers (N=308)	Men (N=735)	Women (N=1021)
	1 Follow orders and shoot	20%	28%	15%	28%	15%
	2 Refuse to shoot them	39	30	59	39	36
	3 Don't know	40	42	26	34	49
		99*	100	100	101	100
55.	What do you think most people actually would do if they were in this situation?					
	1 Follow orders and shoot	35	30	38	39	36
	2 Refuse to shoot them	25	24	32	26	22
	3 Don't know	40	46	30	35	42
		100	100	100	100	100
56.	What do you think you would do in this situation?					
	1 Follow orders and shoot	22	29	12	29	13
	2 Refuse to shoot them	42	30	57	39	44
	3 Don't know	36	41	31	32	43
		100	100	100	100	100

^{*}Due to rounding, percentages do not always add to 100. Missing data have not been included in calculating percentages.

One of our findings confirms the suspicion of Kelman and Lawrence that what people claim they would do themselves corresponds quite closely to what they consider is the right thing to do. Note the similarity in response distributions for question C54 (what should the soldiers do) and question C56 (what do you think you would do). When we match individuals answers to the two questions we find practically no one saying he would do the opposite of what he thinks soldiers ought to do; the great majority give the same answer to both questions. Except for those who check "Don't know," our respondents generally express the position that they would be able to do what they consider to be right — those who believe soldiers should shoot think that they themselves would be able to pull the trigger, and those who think it better to refuse feel that they would be able to resist an order to shoot.*

Given that most respondents say that they would be able to follow the dictates of conscience and do what they think ought to be done, what do they think "most people" would do? Do they think that most people would do what they (the respondents) consider to be the right thing? As the response distributions for question C55 indicate, those respondents who say that "most people" would shoot outnumber those who think that most would refuse. When we match individuals' answers to items C54 and C55, we find that the great majority of civilian respondents who think that soldiers ought to shoot also think that most people would follow orders and shoot. But among those who think that the right thing to do is to refuse, only about half think that is what most people would do; the others divide fairly evenly between those who don't know and those who think most people would shoot.

We have spoken thus far about civilian respondents or about respondents in general. Now let us look at some of the differences between men and women, between various categories of Navy men and

^{*} We examined the correlations between dichotomized versions of the two questions. The correlation between saying that soldiers should shoot (rather than saying refuse or don't know) and saying that one would himself shoot in such a situation is .71 for civilians and .75 for Navy men. The comparable correlations for refusing to shoot are .61 for civilians and .69 for Navy men. (If we were to run correlations on a three-way version of the items that placed "shoot" at one end of the scale, "refuse" at the other, and "don't know" at the midpoint, the coefficients would be a good deal stronger.)

civilians, and between those of different ages and educational levels. A glance at the percentages in Table 2 is sufficient to indicate that there are substantial overall differences among analysis groups. Fewer women than men think that the soldiers in our hypothetical question should follow orders and shoot. The support for shooting is also lower among first-term versus laterterm enlisted men. But the lowest numbers who think soldiers should shoot, and by far the largest numbers in favor of refusing to shoot, are found among the Navy officers. No doubt this is a matter that has been thought about and discussed to a considerable degree by officers in all branches of military service. If the "lesson" to be learned from the My Lai massacre and the subsequent trial is that sometimes orders should not be obeyed, it appears that the message came through most clearly to the officers in our sample. While many of them endorse the general statement that servicemen should obey orders without question (see Figure 11), it is quite another matter when the My Lai example is raised.


Do the Navy officers think that most people would refuse to shoot? About one third of them do, but a slightly higher proportion think that most people would follow orders and shoot. As Figure 12 indicates, the youngest officers experience the greatest discrepancy between what they think most people would do and what they believe ought to be done in such a situation. A similar but less pronounced pattern occurs among civilian men; the younger ones show a substantial discrepancy, on the average, while the older men do not.

Are attitudes in this area related to level of education? The pattern is consistent across all groups: the higher the level of education, the greater the proportion who feel that soldiers should refuse to obey such orders. But when asked what most people actually would do, the responses do not show a consistent relationship to educational level.

AMNESTY

It may seem strange to find a section on amnesty included in a chapter about issues involved in an all-volunteer force. Under all-volunteer conditions there would be no problems of draft-dodging and fewer instances of desertion. But views on amnesty comprise an important part of the present climate of opinion about the military in the United States. And, as we shall shortly see, the amnesty issue produces one of the strongest age polarizations to be examined in this report.

FIGURE 12 Navy Officers' Views on My Lai-Type Incident



Two questions on amnesty state the issue in diametrically opposite terms. Item C51 states: "Going to Canada to avoid fighting in Vietnam was wrong, and those who did so should be punished." Item C52 states: "The men who went to Canada rather than fight in Vietnam were doing what they felt was right. They should be allowed to return to the U.S. without being punished." (Responses to these two items show very high consistency; the product-moment correlation is -.75 for civilians and -.81 for Navy men.)


Responses to the two questions show rather little support for amnesty, on the average. Civilian men and women tend to "agree mostly" that those who went to Canada to avoid fighting should be punished, and they "disagree mostly" with the ideas expressed in Question C52. An index based on the two items is presented in Figure 13. The figure shows clearly the age polarization that we mentioned earlier. First-term enlisted men in the Navy are not very different from civilian men their age — both show a fairly even mix of those who favor and oppose amnesty. But older civilian men are predominantly opposed to amnesty, and the feelings are even stronger among Navy officers and later-term enlisted men.

The age-related differences for the amnesty items are similar to many shown earlier, but the present effects are particularly strong. It should come as no surprise, therefore, to note that views on the amnesty issue are correlated with many other attitudes about military matters. It is beyond the scope of this preliminary report to discuss these correlations in any detail, but we can summarize the general pattern: the more favorable an individual's attitudes toward the military services in general, including military leadership, influence, and use of funds, the more likely one is to be opposed to amnesty.

SUMMARY

It seems safe to conclude from our findings that there is strong majority support for the concept of the all-volunteer force, and relatively little concern about some of the issues which have been raised as potential problems. The nationwide sample supports the all-volunteer approach rather than the draft by nearly a two-to-one margin. There is very strong support for the higher military pay levels considered to be necessary under a volunteer system. (Not surprisingly, the Navy respondents are particularly favorable to the idea of higher pay levels.)

FIGURE 13
Views on Amnesty Related to Age



Note: Data supporting this figure appear in Table 67 of the appendix.

When asked about issues related to the types of people who should staff the military services, there is a slight tendency for people to favor "citizen soldiers" over "career men," but the views seem quite mixed. Most people agree that a wide range of different political viewpoints ought to exist among those in the military service, but they also mostly agree with a statement that "servicemen should obey orders without question." There are some variations by age and education, but the dominant impression to be gained from these responses is that most people have not thought much about the question of what kinds of servicemen will, or should, staff an all-volunteer armed force.

The area of obedience was singled out for a series of more specific questions, based upon the My Lai massacre. While most people agree to the general statement about servicemen obeying orders without question, the majority do not feel that orders to shoot old men, women, and children should be obeyed. When asked if they themselves would obey such an order, more people say they would refuse than say they would shoot — but a very substantial proportion say they don't know what they would do, and these same individuals say they don't know what ought to be done. One group which stands out in this analysis is Navy officers. The officer group shows the lowest proportion who would follow orders and shoot, and the largest proportion who would refuse such orders. Nevertheless, many officers feel that most people faced with such a situation would follow orders and shoot. Such views are especially pronounced among young officers; young civilians show a similar pattern, but to a lesser degree.

If there is a single ideological issue which seems to highlight inter-generational differences, as well as overall views on the military services, it is the issue of amnesty. Average responses show that a majority of respondents clearly do not favor amnesty, but among the younger respondents there is a more even division of opinion on the issue. Views on amnesty correlate with other opinions on military matters; in general, the more favorable one's attitudes toward the military services, the more likely one is to oppose amnesty.

CHAPTER 7

PRO- AND ANTI-ENLISTMENT ATTITUDES

Attitudes favorable or unfavorable to enlistment are important not only among potential enlistees but also among their parents, friends, and wives. In this chapter we review the dimensions presented in earlier chapters, and examine the degree to which they are related to pro- or anti-enlistment views.

RE-ENLISTMENT PLANS AMONG FIRST-TERM NAVY ENLISTED MEN

One source for information about enlistment attitudes consists of those presently in the military service. Respondents in the Navy sample were asked (D16): "What do you plan to do when you complete this enlistment?" Among the first-term enlisted men, 4 percent checked that they would "re-enlist and make the Navy a career," 10 percent checked "re-enlist or extend but undecided about making the Navy a career," 2 percent checked "re-enlist or extend but do not intend to make the Navy a career," and 84 percent checked "return to civilian life."

How are those who plan to re-enlist and perhaps make the Navy a career different from those who plan to return to civilian life? And to what extent do their different plans relate to their perceptions and attitudes about military service? The analyses to be reported here are only preliminary, but they are nonetheless instructive.

The strongest correlates of re-enlistment plans (among those measures in Section C of the questionnaire) are perceptions of job opportunities and fair treatment in the military services. Scores on the Military Job Opportunities Index are more than a full standard deviation higher among those planning to re-enlist and make the Navy a career than among those planning to return to civilian life. When asked whether they would receive more just and fair treatment as a civilian or as a member of the military service (Item C9), those planning to re-enlist (whether sure about a Navy career or not) tend to rate civilian and military treatment as "about the same." Those planning to return to civilian life tend to rate civilian treatment as "more fair" or "much more fair."

More generally, it appears that the relatively small number of first-term enlisted men who plan to make the Navy a career are rather similar in their answers to the later-term enlisted men. Like the later-term enlisted men, first-termers with career plans think that the armed services have about the right amount of influence on the way the country is run (C25), that we may be spending a bit too little on the armed services (C26), that the role of the military services since World War II has been mostly positive (C27), and that ideally the level of military influence (versus civilian influence) should be a good deal higher than it is presently perceived to be. The first-termers with career plans also tend to support past policy in Vietnam, agree mostly that servicemen should follow orders without question, and are mostly opposed to amnesty.

It thus seems clear that self-selection is an important factor in many of the differences we have reported between first-term and later-term Navy enlisted men. It appears that those whose perceptions and attitudes come close to the views of career Navy men are themselves more likely to plan on re-enlisting and making the Navy a career. Whether such a pattern is healthy for the military services or the nation is a matter for debate. We touch on the issue briefly at the end of this chapter.

A GENERAL MEASURE OF ENLISTMENT ATTITUDES

In Chapter 2 we described Item ClO, which asked how the respondent would feel if he had a son who decided to enlist in the military service. Now we will treat that item as a general-purpose indicator of positive feelings about enlistment. For civilian men in their late teens or early twenties, the item can be viewed as illustrative of their views about their own possible enlistment. For older civilians who are parents, it may indicate the viewpoints that have been or will be expressed to their children. And for our sample of Navy men, the item provides a means of expressing their own satisfaction or dissatisfaction with military service.

The intercorrelations between Item C10 and several other items support our view that C10 may be a useful indicator of general feelings about enlistment. Among those civilians who had served in the armed forces, a measure of their satisfaction with their own service experience (Item D20) correlates .54 with Item C10. The comparable correlation among Navy men is .66. A measure of feelings about relatives having been in the armed services (Item D24) is also closely associated with Item C10; the correlations are .48 for civilians and .57 for Navy men. Several other items dealing with perceptions of relatives' feelings about military service (Items D21 and D23) are also correlated with Item C10, though somewhat less strongly.

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Finally, among Navy men we find that re-enlistment intentions (Item D16) are strongly correlated (.48) with attitudes toward a son's enlistment.

Suppose, then, that we consider this item about a son's enlistment as an indicator of pro- and anti-enlistment sentiment. Our next step is to see which of the various perceptions, values and attitudes concerning military service are related to sentiment about enlistment. Do some kinds of dimensions predict more clearly than others? In particular, do ratings of job opportunities and other advantages of military service provide better prediction than general attitudes about military policy and mission?

CORRELATES OF ENLISTMENT ATTITUDES

Table 3 presents a correlational analysis in which every item in Section C of the questionnaire (treated either as an individual item or as part of an index) is related to the question about a son's possible enlistment. We will not review each relationship here, since the reader can go directly to the table for such information. Instead, we will offer a few generalizations based on the overall pattern of relationships, and then comment selectively on particular sets of relationships.

- 1. Perhaps the most general observation that can be made based on Table 3 is that the Navy and civilian correlations lie in the same direction in virtually all instances. In other words, the factors which lead some people to be pro-enlistment and others to be anti-enlistment are basically the same for civilians and Navy men.*
- 2. But the relationships for the Navy and civilian samples are not always equal in their strength. In most cases the correlations are stronger within the Navy sample, no doubt reflecting the fact that the Navy men feel a more personal involvement in many of these matters and see them as more closely interconnected.
- 3. Within the Navy sample, pro-enlistment views seem to be tied most closely to perceptions of working conditions (C6, C9, Military Job Opportunity Index)or trust in military leadership (C19, C24). But a few of the more "ideological" dimensions, such as views on Vietnam (C45-C50, Vietnam Dissent Index) and on amnesty (C51, C52) are also strongly associated with attitudes toward enlistment.

^{*} Recall that we are using the words pro-enlistment and anti-enlistment to refer to a general disposition about enlistment, based on the question about a son's possible enlistment (Item C10). We do not suppose that respondents are necessarily reflecting views about their own possible enlistment.

TABLE 3

Attitudes and Perceptions Correlated with Views Toward a Son's Enlistment

Item	or Index Name P		lations with Item C10: decided to enlist*
		Navy Sample	Civilian Sample
*	Military Job Opportunity Index	.50	.25
* C 6	Get unjust treatment set right	.38	.22
* C 7	Discrimination against women	11	13
* C 8	Discrimination against Black people	15	19
* C 9	Civilian treatment more fair than mi	litary49	27
C11	Enough money for volunteers	01	.01
C12	Soldiers should be mostly citizen so	ldiers19	05
C13	Soldiers should be mostly career men	.12	.09
C14	Servicemen should agree with policy	10	.03
C15	Military should include different vi	ews10	08
C16	Chance of a military takeover in the	U.S18	11
* C17	Armed Forces meet present military n	eeds .16	.11
* C18	Military uses budget efficiently	.32	.22
* C19	Military leaders know what they're d	oing .47	.31
* C20	Possible to improve officer quality	10	02
* C21	Fall short of military preparedness	.04	.04
* C22	Waste in way military services are r	22	18
* C23	Officers try to do a good job	.33	.22
* C24	Trust our military leadership to do	right .50	. 32
C25	Military has too much influence	33	26
C26	U.S. spends too much on military	32	29
C27	Role of military in society posit	ive .35	.29
*	Actual Military Influence Index	27	15
*	Ideal Military Influence Index	.25	.25
C38	U.S. should begin gradual disarmamen	28	19
C39	U.S war to protect rights of oth	ers .29	.14
C40	U.S war to protect own econ. int	erests .15	.11

TABLE 3 (cont.)

Item or Index Name

Product-Moment Correlations with Item C10: Feelings if a son decided to enlist*

	Navy ample	Civilian Sample
C41 U.S war only to defend attack on U.S.	26	13
C42 U.S. needs no more power than U.S.S.R.	27	20
C43 U.S. power should be greater than any other	.23	.17
C44 Present policy based on narrow interests	22	13
C45 Vietnam War damaging to our national honor	25	22
C46 Vietnam War not in national interest	29	21
C47 Vietnam War important to fight Communism	.32	.27
C48 Vietnam War brought us closer to world war	27	18
C49 Vietnam War important to protect friends	.34	.26
C50 Vietnam War important to keep promises	.33	.26
Vietnam Dissent Index	43	34
C51 Draft-dodgers should be punished	. 46	.32
C52 Draft-dodgers should be granted amnesty	43	31
C53 Servicemen should obey orders w/o question	.39	.29
My Lai-type incident follow orders & shoot	.12	.20
My Lai-type incident refuse to shoot	18	17
My Lai-type incident soldiers should shoot	.13	.19
My Lai-type incident soldiers should refuse	18	21
My Lai-type incident most people would shoot	04	.05
My Lai-type incident most people would refuse	02	05
C57 Friends share your views on armed forces	13	02

^{*} A negative (-) correlation indicates that the perception or attitude, as labelled on the left, is associated with negative feelings about a son's enlistment; a positive correlation means that the perception or attitude is associated with positive feelings about a son's enlistment. Because many items (including C10) have reversed scales (e.g., "1" for agree, "4" for disagree), it was often necessary to reverse the sign of the original correlation; such instances have been designated with an asterisk. (p<.01 for all correlations larger than .06.)

4. The dimensions noted above are also fairly strong predictors of enlistment views among civilians, but the ordering of importance is not quite the same. For civilians, the issues of military leadership and the attitudes about Vietnam and amnesty are somewhat stronger predictors than their perceptions of job opportunities in the military services.

We have thus far looked at overall patterns of correlations, without giving much attention to the directions of the relationships. Now let us take a closer look at what it means to be positive or negative about enlistment.

- 1. First of all, there is a very consistent tendency for those who are pro-enlistment (i.e., would be positive about a son's enlistment) to be generally positive about military working conditions, leadership, role in national affairs, and the like. Such relationships, of course, come as no surprise. But there are a number of other relationships that are less obvious.
- 2. Those Navy men who tend to favor the concept of "citizen soldiers" tend to be a bit negative about the prospect of a son's enlisting. There is something of a paradox here; we could not have a viable system in which most people favor "citizen soldiers" rather than "career men" but prefer that their own sons not serve. Perhaps the solution to the paradox lies in the fact that people respond to the question about a son's enlistment in terms of the way the military services actually are, not in terms of the way they would like things to be. While many Navy men (especially first-term enlisted men) would tend to discourage a son's enlistment in the present military services, they might feel quite differently about the military services a decade or two hence.
- 3. Views of both "actual" and "ideal" military (versus civilian) influence are related to attitudes about enlistment. Perhaps it is not surprising to find pro-enlistment respondents showing greater preferences for military influence ideally, but it is interesting to note that these same individuals give relatively low ratings to present military influence. In other words, perceptions of actual military influence seem to be related to one's "ideological" position. For those in the Navy sample, enlistment views show a negative correlation with perceptions of actual influence that is just as strong as the positive correlation with views on ideal levels of influence. For the civilian sample, the relationship with actual influence is somewhat lower, suggesting that civilians answer these questions with fewer ideological overtones.

- 4. The link between enlistment attitudes and more general views on military policy is evident in the responses to Items C38 through C50. Those more favorable toward a son's enlistment also tend to favor greater military power (C42, C43) and a broader mandate for military action; they show greater willingness to consider war to protect the rights of other countries (C39) or defend our own economic interests (C40), rather than going to war only to defend against attack (C41). Those with anti-enlistment views are most likely to be critical of past U.S. actions in Vietnam (Vietnam Dissent Index).
- 5. One of the more unsettling findings is that views on obedience in general, as well as views about a My Lai-type incident, are different among pro- and anti-enlistment respondents. The more positive one is about a son's enlistment, the more likely one is to say that servicemen should obey orders without question (C53), and that even orders to shoot women and children should be followed. To those concerned about the dangers of excessive obedience in an all-volunteer force, this correlation between pro-enlistment attitudes and an emphasis on obedience "without question" is hardly reassuring. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the My Lai-type items showed somewhat lower correlations with enlistment attitudes within the Navy sample, no doubt reflecting the fact that Navy officers (who tend to be quite favorable toward a son's enlistment) are in most cases strongly opposed to following orders when it means shooting civilians.
- 6. Finally, we note that those who would favor a son's enlistment are most likely to be strongly opposed to amnesty for those who went to Canada to avoid fighting in Vietnam (C51, C52). As we noted in the preceding chapter, views on amnesty highlight intergenerational differences as well as differences in views about the military services. It is thus understandable that the amnesty issue is strongly correlated with views about a son's enlistment.

Although the correlation with views on amnesty is understandable, in the light of our other findings, it is nevertheless disquieting to find for this and other dimensions that those favoring a son's enlistment seem to come predominantly from one side of the ideological spectrum. Many of our respondents felt that there ought to be a wide range of different viewpoints among those in the military services (see Item Cl5); perhaps such an objective will be better realized when views about enlistment are less influenced by the memories of Vietnam.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

It is with some hesitation that one draws conclusions and policy implications from data such as these, especially in a preliminary report. Nonetheless, the conclusion seems clear that ideological issues do play an important role in attitudes about enlistment and reenlistment. Among civilians, ideological dimensions slightly outweigh the dimensions of military job opportunities. Given the prominence of views on Vietnam and ammesty among such ideological dimensions, a further conclusion is that the memories of Vietnam (and the issues, such as ammesty, which remain unresolved) are a central factor in attitudes toward enlistment. More specifically, our correlational data support the view that many people are unfavorable toward enlistment because of what went on in Vietnam.

If there is a policy implication to be drawn from this conclusion, it is that the armed services should make every effort to see that their past role in Vietnam is distinguished from their mission for the future. No doubt there will be many advantages to U.S. society in general if we can honestly come to view the sequence of tragic events in Southeast Asia as a more-or-less isolated departure from our traditional military policy. In the specific framework of military manpower policy, such a development would mean an enlarged pool of potential recruits, which would include that large segment of society that is currently alienated from the U.S. military establishment. More important than an increase in numbers of potential recruits, such a change would bring us closer to an all-volunteer armed force staffed by people with a wide range of backgrounds and viewpoints, broadly representative of the larger society.

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APPENDIX

Data Tables
Interview Section From Civilian Version of Instrument
Alternate Navy Version of Instrument
Civilian Instrument -- Self-completed Questionnaire

Number of Cases in Each Navy and Civilian Age Category TABLE A

	245	_	33	17	292	448
	40-44	0	29	51	09	83
ory	35-39 4(_	506	40	19	92
e Categ	30-34 3	2	248 2	77	83	118
in Each Age Category	25-29 3	74	209	. 28	7.1	137
N in	23-24 2	200	47	27	33	44
	1	400	17	∞	41	43
	16-18 19-20 21-22	400	-	0	41	22
	16-18	66	0	0	63	52
	Total N	1178	827	307	745	1058
	,	Enlisted/1st term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Women
			SAMPLE	(Men only) Officers	NATITATO	SAMPLE

112,1 511

Ahead
Get
\Box
0
Related
Age
_
TABLE

		Total	al			Σ	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	1	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
2/////	Enlisted/1st term	3.14	1.01	1.01 3.18	3.25	3.11	3.01	3.04	*	*	*	*	.089
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.77	. 98	*	*	*	3.28	3.61	3.77	3.97	4.02	*	.198
(Men only)	Officers	3.78	.94	*	*	*	3.56	3.52	3.69	4.08	4.24	ł	. 298
CIVILIAN	Wen	3.47	1.07	.07 3.37	3.42	3.20	3.21	3,45	3.36	3.56	3.63	3.55	.113
SAMPLE	Women	3.36	-	3.69	3.53	3.47	3.25	3.23	3.20	3.32	3.44	3,38	.115
112 511													

TABLE 2 Age Related To C2 Get More Education

		Total	a			Σ	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20		21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
	Enlisted/lst term	3.65	1.03	3.84	3.75	3.61	3.46	3.64	*	*	łk	*	.113
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	4.26	88.	łk	-jk	*	3.85	4.09	4.38	4.40	4.36	*	.181
(Men only)	Officers	3.99	.94	k	ł	*	3.67	3.72	4.03	4.30	4.29	*	.268
CIVILIAN	Men	3.89	96.	4.06	3.85	4.00	3.85	3.80	3.90	3.67	3.92	3.91	.095
SAMPLE	Women	3.82	.95	4.02	3.97	4.00	3.71	3.69	3.63	3.59	3.77	3.91	.143
													•

* Scores omitted due to small number in category.

Age Related To C3 Advance To More Responsible Position TABLE 3

		Total	le:			E	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	0. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	30-34	35-39	40-44 ≥45	245	Eta
VAV	Enlisted/1st term	3.42	66.	3.64	3.51	3.36	3.30	3.24	*	*	*	*	.112
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.88	. 98	*	*	÷	3.64	3.72	3.84	4.04	4.15	×	.158
(Men only)	Officers	4.04	.89	*	*	÷	3.93	3.92	3.90	4.30	4.33	*	.215
CIVILIAN	Men	3.70	1.00	3.65	3.66	3.56	3.70	3.62	3.74	3.71	3.85	3.72	.064
SAMPLE	Women	3.60	1.00	00 3.92	3.88	3.74	3.46	3.39	3.50 3.51		3,60	3.64 .140	.140

TABLE 4 Age Related To C4 More Personally Fulfilling Job

		lotal	.al			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	23-24		30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
>>	Enlisted/lst term	2.68	1.17	3.06	2.85	2.59	2.40	2.55	×	*	-ķt	÷	.170
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.51	1.06	*	-j¢	*	3.26	3.28	3.53	3.66	3.84	*	.173
(Men only) Officers	Officers	3.43	1.12	*	*	*	2.96	3.16	3.43	3.78	3.84	+k	.270
			1										
CIVILIAN	Men	3.36	1.13	3.44	3.34	3.05	3.09	3.25	3.30	3.35	3,33	3.46	.107
SAMPLE	Women	3.32 1.12	1.12	3.44	3.39	3.29	3.23	3.16	3.16	3.32	3,3]	3.40	680.

Age Related To C5 Get Ideas Heard 2 TABLE

	Eta	.143	.178	.348	.153	.155
	245	*	-jk	*	2.89	2.89 .155
	40-44	*	3,19	3.43	2.47	2.58
egory	30-34 35-39	*	3.18	3.38	2.80	2.54
Mear Scores By Age Category	30-34	*	3.04	2.77	2.76	2.54
res By	- 1	2.30	2.78	2.69	2.73	2.43
lear, Sco	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	2.19	2.60	2.37	2.42	2.86
Σ	21-22	2.26	*	*	2.32	2.51
	19-20	2.37	*	*	2.83	3.02
	16-18	2.80	*	*	26 3.07	.25 2.79
tal	S.D.	1.09	1.05	1.03	1.26	1.25
Total	Mean	2.33	2.99	2.91	2.78	2.72
		Enlisted/1st term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Women
		>> N	SAMPLE	(Men only)	CIVILIAN	SAMPLE

TABLE 6 Age Related To C6 Unjust Treatment Set Right

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29	30-34	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
	Enlisted/1st term	2.30	1.11	2.61	2.61 2.38	2.25	2.10	2.31	÷	*	-k	*	.121
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.91	1.14	*	*	*	2.36	2.76	2.94	3.08	3,16	*	.171
(Men only)	Officers	2.89 1.08	1.08	*	*	*	2.44	2.71	2.73	3.15	3.45	*	.297
CIVILIAN	Men	2.54	1.23	2.68	2.42	2.39	2.30	2.38	2.70	2.58	2.57	2.55	.088
SAMPLE	Women	2.41 1.17	1.17	2.31	2.51	2.50	2.59 2	2.19.	2.19_ 2.31	2.44	2.32	2.48	760°

TABLE 7 Age Related To C7 Discrimination Against Women

		Total	.a]			X.	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
NAN N	Enlisted/lst term	2.32	1.13	2.25	2.30	2.31	2.34	2.61	*	*	-k	*	890.
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term 2.26	2.26	1.	*	*	*	2.57	2.33	2.24	2.23	2.03	*	.100
(Men only) Officers	Officers	2.51	1.10	*	*	*	2.74	2.68	2.57	2.15	2.29	*	.185
CIVILIAN	Men	2.52	1.21	21 2.60	2.68	2.63	2.49	2.71	2.48	2.50	2.40	2.47	.078
SAMPLE	Women	2.61	1.15	5 2.50	2.93 2.74	2.74	2.44	2.65	2.73	2.57	2.44	2.59	760.

TABLE 8 Age Related To C8 Discrimination Against Blacks

NAVY SAMPLE Enlisted							ממבו המח	Mean scores by Aye category	אשר ימנ	ה ה ה			
Enliste Enliste Officer		Mean	S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20	21-22	23-24	21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
Enliste Officer	Enlisted/lst term	2.40	1.24	2.25	2.35	2.39	2.51	2.64	*	*	*	*	.073
Officer	Enlisted/later term	2.21	-	*	*	*	2.48	2.34	2.16	2.11	2.16	*	.100
	S	2.32	1.01	*	*	*	2.30	2.59	2.39	1.85	2.12	*	.247
Men		2.46	1.22	1.22 2.61	2.71	2.73	2.58	2.72	2.45	2.20	2.23	2.38 .139	.139
Women		2.45	1.20 2.44	2.44	2.55	2.62	2.41	2.52	2.57	2.31	2.27	2.43	920.

Age Related To C9 More Fair: Civilian or Military TABLE 9

		Total	le:			Σ	ear Sco	Mean Scores By Age	Age Cat	Category			
		Mean	Mean S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	21-22	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
>	Enlisted/lst term	4.17	66.	3.85	4.10	4.27	4.32	4.09	*	*	*	*	.135
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.10	1.06	÷	-jk	*	3.70	3.22	3.08	2.96	2.75	*	.196
(Men only)	Men only) Officers	2.94	1.08	*	*	*	3.19	3.25	3.10	2.43	2.38	*	.337
CIVILIAN	Men	3.56	1.06	3.32	3.76	3.76	4.03	3.82	3.68	3.44	3.46	3.44	.177
SAMPLE	Women	3.41	16.	3.28	3.46	3.18	3.45	3.59	3.49	3.39	3.39	3.35	.112

TABLE 10 Age Related To C10 React to Son's Enlistment

		Total	a]			Σ	lean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	9 30-34	35-39	40-44 >45	>45	Eta
27.0	Enlisted/1st term	2.62	.94	.94 2.49	2.59	2.66	2.68	2.51	*	*	*	*	990.
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term 1.81	1.81	.82	łk	*	*	2.04	1.81	1.79	1.81	1.73	*	920.
(Men only)	Officers	1.93	.82	*	*	*	2.04 1.95	1.95	2.08	1.74 1.77	1.77	*	.160
CIVILIAN	Men	2.14	06.	90 2.29	2.41	2.49	2.31	2.07	2.23	2.05	1.98	2.05	.162
SAMPLE	Women	2.23	.87	.87 2.22	2.34	2.12	2.26	2.34 2.12 2.26 2.40	2.24 2.24	2.24	2.15	2.19 .093	.093

TABLE 11 Age Related To C11 Enough Money for Volunteers

		Total	al			∑	lear Sco	Mear Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
200	Enlisted/lst term	1.39	.68	1.38	1.33	1.39	1.42	1.54	*	*	*	·k	.075
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.37	. 68	ĸ	*	-k	1.28	1.30	1.34	1.51	1.37	*	.130
(Men only)	Officers	1.59	. 85	*	*	·k	1.67	1.53	1.65	1.58	1.55	*	. 065
CIVILIAN	Men	1.70	.94	1.56	1.55	1.59	1.55	1.66	1.84	1.90	1.66	1.71	.110
SAMPLE	Women	1.64	06.	90 1.64	1.82	1.58	1.74	1.74 1.71	1.71	1.72	1.46	1.60	.093

TABLE 12 Age Related To C12 Most Citizen Soldiers

		101al	p			Ξ	lean sco	Mean scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29	30-34	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	40-44 >45	>45	Eta
22	Enlisted/lst term	2.21	1.06	1.06 2.03	2.07	2.24	2.42	2.49	-k	*	*	*	.140
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.95	1.01	+ k	+k	-k	2.77	2.92	2.98	2.94	3.06	·k	090.
(Men only) Officers	Officers	2.81	.97	-k	*	+k	2.59	2.85		2.76 3.00	2.78	*	.108
CIVILIAN	Men	2.31	1.10	2.05	2.38	2.17	2.09	2.51	2.33	2.49	2.42	2.29	911.
SAMPLE	Women	2.19	1.06	1.06 1.96 2.13	2.13	2.33		2.14 2	19	2.24	2.40	2.20	980.

TABLE 13 Age Related To C13 Most Career Men

		Total	a			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By	Age	Category			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22	23-24	25-29	23-24 25-29 30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
>//\/	Enlisted/1st term	2.51	1.06	2.65	2.54	2.49	2.45	2.37	*	*	*	*	090.
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.20	1.04	*	ķ	+k	2.23	2.24	2.13	2.30	1.97	*	.093
(Men only) Officers	Officers	2.21	.95	*	*	*	2.52	2.22	2.27	2.10	2.02	*	.144
CIVILIAN	Men	2.32	1.09	2.44	2.64	2.54	2.52	2.48	2.37	2.48	1.75	2.22	.198
SAMPLE	Women	2.50	1.08	2.76	2.77	2.64	2.70	2.56	2.69	2.60	2.44	2.32	.156

Age Related To C14 Servicemen Should Agree With Policy TABLE 14

		Total	le:			Σ	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
No.	Enlisted/1st term	2.43		2.28	2.34	2.46	2.50	2.78	*	*	·k	*	.106
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.63		*	*	*	2.57	2.78	2.60	2.53	2.57	*	.087
(Men only)	Officers	2.99	.97	*	*	*	3.37	2.99	2.99	2.90	2.88	*	.135
CIVILIAN	Men	2.71	1.17	2.50	2.71	3.00	2.73	3.03	2.77	2.90	2.66	2.57	.145
SAMPLE	Women	2.57	1.15	1.15 2.79	2.67	2.83	2.60	2.60 2.64	2.71	2.58	2.62	2.44 .112	.112

TABLE 15 Age Related To C15 Different Political Views

	9 40-44 ≥45 Eta	* * * 034	2.00 * .115	1.80 * .122	2.27 2.16 .108	2.14 2.09 .081
tegory	35-39	*	2.27	1.88	2.24	2.01 1.96
Age Ca	30-34	*	2.17	1.67 1.63	2.05	2.01
res By	25-29	1.80	1.99	1.67	2.11	2.10 2.02
Mean Scores By Age Category	23-24	1.93	2.02	1.89	1.82	2.10
Σ	21-22	1.87	*	*	1.98	1.80
	19-20	1.86	*	*	1.86	2.22
	D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	1.87	*	*	06 2.10	03 2.16
Total	S.D.	80	1.00	. 83	1.06	1.03
To1	Mean	1.87	2.13	1.73	2.11	2.06
		Enlisted/lst term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Мотеп
		>	SAMPLE	(Men only)	CIVILIAN	SAMPLE

TABLE 16 Age Related To C16 Military Coup in U.S.

		Total	a			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	30-34	35-39	40-44	≥45	Eta
>	Enlisted/lst term	2.50	.79	79 2.39	2.47	2.51	2.60 2	2.48	*	*	*	k	.068
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.75	.79	*	*	*	2.62	2.65	2.79	2.82	2.74	*	560.
(Men only)	Officers	2.86	.73	*	*	*	2.63	2.85	2.66	3.08	3.14	*	.263
CIVILIAN	Men	2.57	. 82	82 2.41	2.41	2.34	2.55	2.35	2.53	2.63	2.58	2.71	.168
SAMPLE	Women	2.59	.8	.81 2.42	2.41	2.51	2.35	2.56	2.60	2.63	2.68	2.65	.113

* Scores omitted due to small number in category.

Age Related To C17 Armed Forces Meet Present Military Need TABLE 17

		Total	le:			Σ.	Mear. Scores By	res By	Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
4	Enlisted/1st term	3.45	1.05	1.05 3.36	3.40	3.50	3.40	3.73	*	*	*	*	.084
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.61	. 93	*	*	*	3.30	3.51	3.55	3.81	3.79	*	.163
(Men only) Officers	Officers	3.46	66.	*	*	*	3.26	3.48	3.52	3,53	3,39	*	.082
CIVILIAN	Men	3.86	.97	3.64	3.62	4.00	3.94	3.90	3.92	3.85	4.02	3.87	וווי
SAMPLE	Women	3.83	88	88 3.82	3.66	3.66	3,95	3.84	3.85	3.75	3.94	3.83	620.

Age Related To C18 Military Use Budget Efficiently TABLE 18

		Total	al			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	30-34	35-39	40-44 ≥45	>45	Eta
>	Enlisted/1st term	2.15	1.08	2.74	2.74 2.32		2,00 1.89	1.92	÷	*	*	*	. 232
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term 2.51	2.51	1.07	*	*	łk	2.17	2.28	2.57	2.65	2,85	*	. 183
×	(Men only) Officers	2.41	1.08	*	*	*	1.96	2.15	2.36	2.90	2.80	-jk	.298
CIVILIAN	Men	2.65	1.3	2.95	2.57	2.37	2.36	2.49	2.55	2.67	2.73	2.72 .135	.135
SAMPLE	Women	2.86	1.00	3.10	3.10 2.70	2.76	2.98	2.71	2.81	2.81 2.76 3.04	3.04	2.89 .110	.110

TABLE 19 Age Related To C19 Military Leaders Are Smart

	Eta Eta	× °077	* .226	* .33]	3.47 .270	3.47 .106
	40-44	+ x	3.60	3.90	3.73	3.40
egory	35-39	*	3.50	3.88	3.36	3.25
Mean Scores By Age Category	30-34	*	3.46	3.36	3.16	3.26
ores By	23-24 25-29	2.82	3.13	3.21	3.17	3.25
Jean Sco	23-24	2.58	2.79	3.00	2.70	3.20
~	21-22	2.54	*	*	2.73	3.29
	16-18 19-20	2.64	*	*	2.67	3.34
		2.75	*	*	3.39	3.29
Total	S.D.	1.06	.97	.97	=	.94
To	Mean	2.62	3.35	3.45	3.29	3,36
		Enlisted/1st term	Enlisted/later term	Men only) Officers	Men	Women
			SAMPLE	Men only)	CIVILIAN	SAMPLE

Age Related To C20 Possible Improvement of Officer Quality TABLE 20

		Total	le:			Σ	lean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cati	egory			
		Mean	S.D.		19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	30-34 35-39 40-44	>45	E ta
>>	Enlisted/1st term	3.57	1.03	3.10	3.57	3.62	3.68	3.70	*	*	*	*	.146
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.68	06.	*	*	*	3.85	3.73	3.69	3.56	3.73	*	060°
(Men only) Officers	Officers	3.41	.80	*	*	*	3.63	3.43	3.57	3.20	3.20	*	.202
CIVILIAN	Men	3.38	76.	3.27	3.22	3.55	3.52	3.44	3.28	3.41	3.45	3,39	.085
SAMPLE	Мотел	3.31	. 85	3.33	3.19	3.20	3.42	3.33	3.21	3.29	3.17	3.37	.092

Age Related To C21 Fall Short of Military Preparedness TABLE 21

		Total	tal			~	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	1	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	1745	Eta
>>	Enlisted/lst term	2.75	1.05	2.70	2.76	2.69	2.80	2.91	*	*	*	*	.055
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.94	. 95	łk	*	*	2.72	2.83	3.04	2.97	2.91	*	.103
(Men only) Officers	Officers	2.90	1.03	*	*	*	2.93	2.76	2.71	3.15	3.20	*	.198
CIVILIAN	Men	2.61	1.17	2.45	2.33	2.20	2.52	2.54	2.43	2.83	2.63	2.77	.159
SAMPLE	Women	2.61	1.05	2.48	2.89	2.38	2.42	2.49	2.52	2.73		2.66	.118

TABLE 22 · Age Related To C22 Waste in Military Services

NAVY SAMPLE Enlisted/later term 3.69 (Men only) Officers Men	Mean											
Enlisted/lst t Enlisted/later Officers		Mean S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
Enlisted/later Officers	term 3.69	1.14	3.27	3.60	3.72	3.84	4.19	*	*	÷	*	.171.
Officers	term 3.52	1.00	*	*	*	3.72	3.65	3.50	3.39	3.43	*	.110
Men	3.54	.97	*	*	*	3.82	3.76	3.58	3.25	3.18	*	.250
	3.49	1.16	2.93	3.41	3,95	3.88	3.74	3.38	3.35	3.57	3.50	.200
Women	3.35	1.10	3.26	3.16	3.59	3.15	3.44	3.12	3,33	3.26	3.43 .119	.119

TABLE 23 Age Related To C23 Officers Try to Do Well

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20	21-22	21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
22.0	Enlisted/lst term	2.97	96.	3.07	2.95	2.95	2.98	3.05	*	ķ	*	-k	.042
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.32	. 89	-jk	·k	·k	2.92	3.20	3.33	3.42	3.58	*	.171
(Men only)	Men only) Officers	3.74	.87	*	*	ķ	3.63	3.47	3.65	4.18	4.08	+k	.313
CIVILIAN	Men	3.37	96.	3.53	3.19	2.83	2.88	3.27	3.25	3.38	3.48	3.52	.217
SAMPLE	Момеи	3.56	. 83	3.69	3.34	3,43	3.63	3.44	3.48	3.57	3.67	3.61	.113

TABLE 24 · Age Related To C24 Trust Military Leadership

		Total	le:			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29		30-34	35-39	40-44	N45	Eta
>	Enlisted/lst term	2.83	1.05	2.96	2.89	2.76	2.74	2.95	łk	*	*	*	.075
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.57	16.	*	+k	*	3.00	3.32	3.68	3.70	3.91	*	.255
(Men only)	Officers	3.62	. 98	÷	*	*	3.15	3.43	3.42	4.03 4.16	4.16	*	.355
CIVILIAN	Men	3.39	1.12	12 3.25	3.00	2.75	2.64	3.21	3,39	3.57	3.67	3.59	.264
SAMPLE	Women	3.51	.97	3.51	97 3.51 3.41	3.37	3.34	3.32	3.44	3.55	3.60	3.62	.122

TABLE 25 Age Related To C25 Influence of Military on U.S.

		Total	.a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	i i	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	1745	Eta
>	Enlisted/1st term	2.76	.87	2.90	2.81	2.71	2.70	2.66	*	*	*	*	.077
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.31	69.	*	*	*	3.23	3.19	3.40	3.36	3.27	*	.127
(Men only)	Men only) Officers	2.97	.75	*	*	*	2.63	2.91	2.90	3.08	3.29	*	.248
CIVILIAN	Men	2.78	.89	2.82	2.52	2.42	2.30	2.79	2.96	2.85	2.87	2.83 .185	.185
SAMPLE	Мотеп	2.86	.75	2.82	2.63	2.69	2.61	2.81	2.88	2.99	2.84	2.93	.138

TABLE 26 Age Related To C26 Amount U.S. Spent on Military

		Total	a]			\mathbf{x}	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
22	Enlisted/lst term	2.99	1.16	3.32	3.12	2.95	2.78	2.65	*	*	*	łk	.152
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.61	.92	*	*	*	3.56	3.62	3.68	3.57	3.52	*	090°
(Men only)	Officers	3.01	.97	*	*	*	2.70	2.92	2.88	3.23	3,33	*	. 209
CIVILIAN	Men	2.54	.94	2.70	2.41	2.39	2.15	2.26	2.60	2.52	2.63	2.63 .161	.161
SAMPLE	Women	2.63	.85	2.69	2.72	2.55	2.51	2.49	2.54	2.75	2.65	2.68	660.

TABLE 27 Age Related To C27 Role of Military in Society

	245 Eta	* .053	* 039	* .180	2.27 .221	2.23 .127
	40-44	*	2.09	2.10	2.08	2.14
egory	35-39	+k	2.17	1.95	2.14	2.24 2.30
Age Cat	30-34 35-39	-jk	2.18	2.27	2.18	2.24
Mean Scores By Age Category		2.44	2.16	2.21	2.30	2.29
ean Sco	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	2.44	2.17	2.30	2.64	2.50
Σ	21-22	2.46	+k	*	2.68	2.37
	19-20	2.37	÷.	+k	2.59	2.43
	16-18	72 2.42	4k	łk	73 2.30	62 2.29
le:	S.D.	.72	.61	.63	.73	.62
Total	Mean	2.42	2.16	2.18	2.30	2.27
		Enlisted/lst term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Women
		2	SAMPLE	(Men only) Officers	CIVILIAN	SAMPLE

Age Related To C28 Now Who Decides Foreign Involvements . 82 TABLE

		Total	al			Ĭ.	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Fta
> >	Enlisted/1st term	2.83	1.41	41 2.81	2.96	2.83	2.72	2.41	-jk	·k	-jk	+k	160°
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.88	1.07	-jk	-j¢	+k	2.46	1.88	1.76	1.91	1.88	łk	.145
(Men only)	Officers	1.72	1.08	łk	ķ	k	2.04	2.01	1.74	1.43	1.28	*	.269
TITELLAN	Men	2.93	1.34	3.18	3.21	2 2	3 64	3 10	0 7A	2 75	2 60	70 0	104
SAMPLE			· •)	•				7.00	tc1. +0.2	+ 10
	Women	2.97	1.38	38 3.23	3,18	3,24		3.43 3.08 2.94	2.94	3.02	2.78	2.83 .128	.128
And the second s		The same of the sa											

Age Related To C29 Like Who Decides Foreign Involvement TABLE 29

		Total	[8			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	Mean S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
	Enlisted/1st term	2.70	1.14	1.14 2.95	2.84	2.62	2.51	2.60	*	*	-jk	*	.125
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.16	1.13	+k	*	*	3.33	3.01	3.27	3.12	3.28	*	.104
(Men only)	Officers	2.20	1.04	łk	+k	*	2.19	2.26	2.23	2.08	2.12	*	.068
CIVILIAN	Men	2.63	1.21	2.60	2.48	2.33	1.94	2.64	2.70	2.83	2.70	2.69	.152
SAMPLE	Мотел	2.73	1.05 2.77	2.77	2.80	2.59	2.57	2.55	2.68	3 3.16	2.54	2.78 .148	.148

TABLE 30 · Age Related To C30 Now Who Decides Field Tactics

		Total	a]			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	i	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44	245	Eta
VIANV	Enlisted/1st term	3.94	3.94 1.25	4.08	4.00	4.08 4.00 4.01 3.84	3.84	3.26	*	÷	*	*	.152
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.83	2.83 1.43	-jk	*	*	3.30	3.04	2.63	2.80	2.64	*	.142
(Men only)	Officers	3.01	3.01 1.42	-jk	*	*	3.26	3.23	3.05	2.83	2.61	*	.166
CIVILIAN	Men	3.91	3.91 1.25	4.19	4.10	4.08	4.15	4.10 4.08 4.15 4.07	3.72	3.45	3.48	3.97	3.97 .186
SAMPLE	Momen	3.92	3.92 1.18	3.96	4.14	4.20	4.19	3.96 4.14 4.20 4.19 4.05 3.89	3.89	3.87	3.75	3.82	.113

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

TABLE 31 Age Related To C31 Like Who Decides Field Tactics

		Total	a			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	Mean S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	17	Eta
2/2/2	Enlisted/lst term	4.24	.98	4.40	98 4.40 4.29	4.26	4.05 4.14	4.14	*	*	*	*	.103
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	4.53	.72	*	*	*	4.39	4.51	4.57	4.49	4.62	*	920°
(Men oniy)	Officers	4.44	.75	*	*	*	4.26	4,35	4,35 4,27	4.63	4.78	*	.267
CIVILIAN	Men	3.99	1.10	10 3.97	3.42	4.03	3.88	3.67	3.94	3,85	4.15	4.19	202
SAMPLE	Women	3.88	1.06	.06 3.73	3.86	3,53	3.70	3.80		4.15	3.75	3.92	.125

TABLE 32 · Age Related To C32 Now Who Decides New Weapons

		10tal	l e			Σ	ean sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	ļ	16-18	19-20	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	23-24	25-29	30-34	3539	40-44	>45	Eta
>>	Enlisted/lst term	3.17	1.40	3.45	3.20	3.23	3.05	2.68	*	*	*	*	,116
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.22	1.19	*	*	*	2.57	2.22	2.08	2.32	2.24	*	.108
(Men only)	Officers	2.76	2.76 1.24	*	*	*	3.07	2.93	2.84	2.60	2.28	*	.208
	M												
CIVILIAN	Men	3.43	1.36	3.61	3.51	3.65	4.06	3.67	3.24	3.36	2.87	3.41	.181
SAMPLE	Women	3.47	1.35	3.90	3.71	4.00	3.68	3,55	3.61	3.25	3.22	3,33	.159

Weapons
New
Decides
Who
Like
033
To
Related
Age
33
TABLE

		Total	a]			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			34
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
>/\V\	Enlisted/lst term	3.60	1.12	3.86	3.69	3,52	3.44	3.57	*	*	*	*	.11
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	4.03	.87	÷	*	*	3.98	3.95	4.09	3.98	4.21	*	.092
(Men only)	Officers	3.75	96.	-k	*	*	3.52	3.75	3.57	3.90	4.02	*	.182
CIVILIAN	Men	3.49	1.19	3.29	3.20	3.31	3.12	3.31	3.42	3.53	3.58	3.68	.157
SAMPLE	Women	3.40	1.08	3.46	3.52	3.10	3.43	3.19	3.32	3.56	3.21	3.50	.129

TABLE 34 · Age Related To C34 Now Who Decides Military Pay

		Total	a]			X	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	Mean S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	21-22	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	1745	Eta
V// W	Enlisted/1st term	2.39	1.33	1.33 2.74	2.56	2.34	2.17	1.92	*	*	*	*	.157
SAMPLE	Enlisted/laver term	1.55	.83	*	*	*	1.85	1.56	1.41	1.62 1.64	1.64	*	.144
(Men only)	Officers	1.65	e 0	*	ķ	*	1.63	1.92		1.64 1.53 1.33	1.33	*	.250
CIVILIAN	Men	2.71	1.31	3.07	2.93	3.10	3.16 2.93	2.93	2.52	2.43	2.20	2.66	.201
SAMPLE	Momen	2.86	1.38	3,43	3.06	3.05	3.22	2.91	2.70	2.79	2.92	2.73 .139	.139

TABLE 35 Age Related To C35 Like Who Decides Military Pay

MAVY Enlisted/latterm 3.31 1.16 3.67 3.45 3.22 3.09 3.14 * * * * * * 1.15 3.67 3.45 3.22 3.09 3.14 * * * * * * 1.15 3.67 3.45 3.22 3.09 3.14 * * * * * 1.15 3.67 3.64 3.73 * 1.15 3.67 3.00 3.07 3.64 3.73 * 1.15 3.10 3.00 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.07 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.00		Total				Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
Enlisted/lst term 3.31 1.16 3.67 3.45 3.22 3.09 3.14 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 3.09 3.64 3.73 * * Officers 3.00 1.07 * * * * 3.06 3.18 2.82 * Men 2.90 1.17 2.92 2.74 2.95 2.91 2.96 2.68 3.07 2.97 2.92 Women 3.10 1.04 3.25 3.44 3.05 3.12 2.93 3.12 3.17 3.06		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29		35-39	40-44		Eta
Enlisted/latier term 3.77 1.06 * * * 3.91 3.63 3.99 3.64 3.73 * Officers 3.00 1.07 * * * * 3.00 3.07 2.96 3.18 2.82 * Men 2.90 1.17 2.92 2.74 2.95 2.91 2.96 2.68 3.07 2.97 2.92 Women 3.10 1.04 3.25 3.44 3.05 3.12 2.93 3.12 3.22 3.17 3.06	 Enlisted/lst term	3.31	1.16	3.67		3.22	3.09	3.14	*	*	*	*	.153
Officers 3.00 1.07 * * * 3.00 3.07 2.96 3.18 2.82 * Men 2.90 1.17 2.92 2.74 2.95 2.91 2.96 2.68 3.07 2.97 2.92 Women 3.10 1.04 3.25 3.44 3.05 3.12 2.93 3.12 3.22 3.17 3.06	 Enlisted/later term	3.77	1.06	ł	*	*	3.91	3.63	3.99	3.64	3.73	*	.154
2.90 1.17 2.92 2.74 2.95 2.91 2.96 2.68 3.07 2.97 2.92 an 3.10 1.04 3.25 3.44 3.05 3.12 2.93 3.12 3.22 3.17 3.06		3.00	1.07	*	*	*	3.00	3.07	2.96		2.82	*	.102
3.10 1.04 3.25 3.44 3.05 3.12 2.93 3.12 3.22 3.17 3.06	 Men	2.90	1.17		2.74	2.95	2.91	2.96	2.68	3.07	2.97	2.92	.087
	 Women	3.10		3.25	3.44	3.05					3.17	3.06	.113

TABLE 36 · Age Related To C36 Now Who Decides Use Nuclear

		Total	a]			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.		16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
NAW.	Enlisted/1st term	2.57	1.53	2.85	2.70	2.56	2.39	2.08	*	÷	÷	+k	.11.9
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.60	1.00	-k	*	*	2.07	1.64	1.50	1.60	1.55	*	.130
(Men only)	Officers	1,36	.79	*	*	*	1.63	1.63 1.60 1.31	1.31	1.13	1.04	+k	.287
CIVILIAN	Men	2.73	1.52	.52 3.21	3,17	2.85	3.28	2.96	2.56	2.61	2.07	2.64 .201	.201
SAMPLE	Women	3.04	1.57	1.57 3.35	3.39	3.65	3.65 3.42	3.18	2.97	2.94	2.82	2.87 .147	.147

TABLE 37 Age Related To C37 Like Who Decides Use Nuclear

		Total	a]			Σ	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	2324	25-29	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	145	Eta
NAW	Enlisted/lst term	2.78 1.28	1.28	3.19		2.95 2.74	2.45	2.38	*	*	*	*	.182
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.89 1.30	1.30	*	+ ¢	*	3.04	2.82	2.94	2.87	2.89	*	.045
(Men only) Officers	Officers	1.83 1.02	1.02	*	*	×	1.74	1.89	1.87	1.87 1.90 1.67	1.67	*	980.
CIVILIAN	Men	2.74	1.40	2.65	2.55	2.39	2.59	2.71	2.54	3.03 2.66	2.66	2.87	.123
SAMPLE	Мотеп	2.94	1.25	.25 2.92	3.18	2.80	2.74	2.58	2.96	3.32 2.90	2.90	2.99 .150	.150

TABLE 38 · Age Related To C38 U.S. Should Gradually Disarm

3.05
2.52
2.78 1.05 2.52

TABLE 39 Age Related To C39 U.S. War To Protect Others

		Total	a]			Ž	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By /	Age Cati	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
e d	Enlisted/1st term	2.47	.97	2.60	2.46	2.45	2.47	2.46	*	*	*	*	.041
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.98	.94	*	*	*	2.35	2.05	1.88	1.97	1.88	*	.123
(Men only)	Men only) Officers	2.02	98°	-jk	*	*	2.33	2.05	2.12	1.77	1.86	*	.185
CIVII IAN	Men	2.38	1.01	2.41	2.62	2.78	2.58	2.44	2.07	2.17	2.02	2.46	.202
SAMPLE	Women	2.50	1.03		2.56		2.64		2.48 2.41	2.04			.146

TABLE 40 · Age Related To C40 U.S. War To Protect Economy

		Total	a]			Σ.	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20	21-22	21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	17	Eta
6	Enlisted/lst term	1.87	.94	1.82	1.85		1.86 1.91	1.96	*	÷	*	*	.035
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.69	06.	*	*	*	1.94	1.73	1.64	1.71	1.51	*	660°
(Men only)	Officers	1.98	.92	*	*	*	2.37	2.01	1.95	2.03	1.71	*	.186
CIVILIAN	Men	2.07	1.04	2.22	2.12	2.40	2.18	2.09	1.98	1.73	1.93	2.08	.138
SAMPLE	Women	2.02	1.00	2.00	1.91	2.20	2.14	2.00	1.97	1.83	2.01	2.06	620°

TABLE 41 Age Related To C41 U.S. Defend Only U.S.

		101al	 			Ē	ean sco	Mean scores By Age Category	4ge Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	30-34	35-39	40-44 ≥45	245	Eta
>/\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	Enlisted/lst term	2.00	.94	1.92	2.02	1.96	2.04	2.01	*	*	*	*	.041
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.62 1.06	1.06	*	*	*	2.17	2.53	2.69	2.67	2.78	*	.127
Men only)	Men only) Officers	2.59	96.	*	*	*	1.93	2.55	2.55 2	2.70	2.98	*	.282
CIVILIAN	Men	2.00	76.	2.13	2.02	1.78	1.78 1.70	2.07	2.17	2.16	2.29	1.88 .167	.167
SAMPLE	Women	1.87	. 95	2.08	2.16	2.02	2.02	1,88	1.94	2.07	2.04	1.68	.180

TABLE 42 Age Related To C42 U.S. Military Power Vs. U.S.S.R.

		~				1
	Eta	.158	.194	.139	.170	.102
	>45	*	*	-jk	3.07	3.06
	40-44	*	3.60	3.20	2.98	3.09
egory	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	*	3.57	3.08	2.98	3.04
Age Cat	30-34	*	3.43	2.96	2.77	2.92
res By	25-29	2.78	3.27	2.93	2.69	2.86
Mean Scores By Age Category	23-24	2.68	3.07	2.74	2.44	2.88
Σ	21-22	2.81	*	*	2.66	2.71
	19-20	3.08	*	*	2.66	2.89
	16-18	3.03	*	*	2.87	2.82
:a]	S.D.	2.90 1.00	.77	.91	1.10	1.04
Total	Mean S.D.	2.90	3.42	2.99	2.90 1.10	2.97 1.04
		Enlisted/lst term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Women
		27.08	SAMPLE	(Men only)	CIVILIAN	SAMPLE

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

Age Related To C43 U.S. Military Power Vs. Others 43 TABLE

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	1745	Eta
	Enlisted/1st term	2.46	66.	2.21	2.31	2.57	2.66	2.54	*	*	*	*	.156
	Enlisted/later term	2.09	96.	*	*	*	2.26	2.32	1.98	2.00	1.94	*	.161
(Men only) Officers	fficers	2.54	88.	*	*	*	2.93	2.61	2.42	2.53	2.41	*	.172
	Men	2.30 1.05	1.05	2.50	2.66	2.88	2.55	2.39	2.41	2.13	2.22	2.09	.222
SAMPLE	Women	2.18 1.04	1.04	2.45	2.43		2.63 2.37	2.33	2.15	2.01 2.03	2.03	2.07 .163	.163

TABLE 44 Age Related To C44 Foreign Policy in Own Interest

		lotal	p			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
NAW.	Enlisted/1st term	2.20	.84	2.20	2.19	2.21	2.21	2.10	*	*	*	*	.034
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.50	.91	*	+ k	*	2.38	2.41	2.49	2.57	2.64	*	.084
(Men only)	Officers	2.64	06.	*	*	*	2.19	2.54	2.57	2.83	3.00	÷	.256
CIVILIAN	Men	2.30 1.00	1.00	2.45	2.18	2.03	2.03	2.03	2.34	2.30	2.36	2.40	.148
SAMPLE	Women	2.37	. 98	2.38	2.38	2.11	2.13	2.31	2.55	2.21	2.33	2.42	.115

Age Related To C45 Vietnam Damage National Honor 45 TABLE

		Total	٦ ا			Ξ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	Mean S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	2,15	Eta
>>	Enlisted/1st term	2.03	66.		2.12	1.98	2.18 2.12 1.98 1.93	1.85	*	ф	*	*	260°
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.37	1.06	*	-j¢	ķ	2.00	2.29	2.34	2.45	2.66	*	.130
(Men only)	Officers	1.86	88	*	*	k	1.44	1.78	1.44 1.78 1.81 2.10	2.10	2.10	*	.222
CIVILIAN	Men	2.18	1.1	2.23	2.02	2.10	2.12		2.16 2.21	2.27	2.37	2.14	.071
SAMPLE	Women	2.33	2.33 1.12	2.54	2.44	2.17	2.54		2.37	2.27	2.41	2.27	.080

Age Related To C46 Vietnam Not in National Interest TABLE 46.

		Total	[6			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By.	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
	Enlisted/lst term	2.17 1.08	1.08	2.47	2.25	2.07	2.18 1.95	1.95	-j¢	*	+k	-j¢	.118
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.60 1.02	1.02	+k	- k	*	2.24	2.52	2.60	2.68	2.82	*	.119
(Men only)	Officers	2.26	66°	*	·k	*	1.63	2.08	2.23	2.65	2.61	*	.307
CIVILIAN	Men	2.14 1.08	1.08	2.47	2.20	2.00	2.00	1.74	2.16	2.44	2.30	2.09	.179
SAMPLE	Women	2.25 1.10	1.10	2.50	2.41	2.20	2.32	2.33	2.33 2.28	2.38	2.28	2.14 .101	.101

Age Related To C47 Vietnam Important to Fight Communism 47 TABLE

		Total	al			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
>>\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	Enlisted/lst term	2.35 1.03	1.03	1.86	2.33	2.40	2.49	2.50	*	÷.	*	-jk	.156
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.94	.97	*	÷	*	2.37	2.13	1.88	1.82	1.69	×	.182
(Men only)	Officers	2.52	60.	*	*	+k	2.96	2.67	2.60	2.30	2.10	k	.279
CIVILIAN	Men	2.22	1.08	2.21	2.51	2.76	2.64	2.50	2.05	2.07	2.05	2.10	.206
SAMPLE	Women	2.20 1.07	1.07	2.18	2.32	2.20	2.25	2.32	2.21	2.27	2.18	2.12	.071

TABLE 48 · Age Related To C48 Vietnam Closer to World War

		Total	[p:			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
A/VØN	Enlisted/lst term	2.33	76.	2.04	2.26	2.33	2.46	2.65	*	*	*	k	.139
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.81	66°	÷	-k	*	2.44	2.81	2.79	2,92	2.85	*	. 111
(Men only)	Officers	3.04	.84	×	-jk	*	2.70	2.99	2.92	3,18	3.35	*	.227
CIVILIAN	Men	2.63 1.09	1.09	2.53	2.27	2.39	2.52	2.56	2.68	2.61	2.92	2.70	.135
SAMPLE	Women	2.51 1.09	1.09	2.40	2.23	2.30	2.28	2.55	2.60	2.35	2.75	2.54	.118
													1

Age Related To C49 Vietnam Important to Protect Friends 49 TABLE

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By /	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
	Enlisted/1st term	2.51	.94	2.20	2.46	2.55	2.57	2.76	*	*	*	*	.125
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.00	. 89	*	*	*	2.46	2.18	1.93	1.88	1.78	*	.196
n only)	Men only) Officers	2.44	.94	*	*	*	2.93	2.64	2.55	2.00	2.04	*	.329
CIVILIAN	Men	2.34 1.02	1.02	2.30	2.59	2.93	2.85	2.49	2.24	2.12	2.22	2.23	.216
SAMPLE	Women	2.37 1.05	1.05	2.54	2.48	2.60	2.45	2.52	2.45	2.22	2.39	2.27	.115

Age Related To C50 Vietnam Important to Keep Promises TABLE 50

	Eta	060°	.206	.302	.238	.209
			-		2.07	1.97
	245	*	*	*	2	-
	40-44	*	99*1	1.90	2.10	2.13
ر الله م	35-39	*	1.82	2.36 1.83 1.90	2.03	2.44 1.97
ישטר השני	30-34	*	1.90	2.36	2.24	
Mean scores by Age calegory	25-29	2.73	2.17	2.45	2.49	2.45
edn oco	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	2.56	2.37	2.74	2.76	2.42
Ē	21-22	2.54	*	*	2.76	2.43
	19-20	2.42	*	*	2.76	2.36
	16-18	2.40	*	*	2.32	2.31
a	S.D.	.97	.92	86.	1.07	1.03
101a	Mean S.D.	2.50	1.95	2.27	2.26 1.07	2.18 1.03
		Enlisted/lst term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Women
		8	SAMPLE	(Men only)	CIVIIIAN	SAMPLE

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

TABLE 51 Age Related To C51 Punish Draft Dodgers

	Total	[a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
	Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29		30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
Enlisted/lst term	2.57	1.15	2.78	2.69	2.53	2.42	2.25	*	*	*	*	.121
Enlisted/later term	1.45	.78	ķ	ķ	+k	1.94	1.60	1.41	1.25	1.42	*	.227
(Men only) Officers	1.69	.93	*	*	*	2.15		1.97 1.81	1.18	1.18 1.22	*	.380
Men	1.96	1.96 1.15	2.42	2.81	2.76	2.64	2.24	1.73	1.80	1.55	1.65	.368
Women	2.15 1.17	1.17	2.98	2.36	2.68	2.83		2.10	2.04	1.96	1.95	.256

TABLE 52. Age Related To C52 Grant Amnesty

2.38 2.47 * * * 2.39 2.34	Total		Meal) Score	s By A	Mean Scores By Age Category	gory			
/lst term 2.48 1.15 2.24 2.38 2.47 /later term 3.54 .79 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *			-22 2:	3-24	5-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
3.39 .88 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	2.24				2.92	*	*	*	*	.140
3.08 1.13 2.55 2.39 2.34		4			3.44	3.54	3.68	3.72	*	.198
3.08 1.13 2.55 2.39 2.34		*			3.12	3.34	3.78	3.84	*	. 355
2 0 1 1 0 00 0 1 1 0 0	2.55	1			2.84	3.31	3.30	3,48	3,36	.355
67.2 1/.2 22.2 01.1 /0.2	2.22	2.71 2	2.25	2.43	2.69	2.98	3.07	3.25	3.01	.232

* Scores omitted due to small number in category.

TABLE 53 Age Related To C53 Obey Without Question

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age	res By	Age Cat	Category			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	Mean S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	745	Eta
NVN	Enlisted/1st term	2.78	.94	2.85	2.78	2.79	2.77	2.66	*	*	*	*	.039
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.11	. 83	*	*	*	2.54	2.25	2.13	1.90	1.91	*	.213
(Men only)	Men only) Officers	2.28	.73	*	*	*	2.33	2.35	2.34	2.13	2.14	*	.136
CIVILIAN	Men	2.11	76.	2.13	2.63	2.75	2.85	2.29	2.25	1.98	1.96	1.80	.343
SAMPLE	Women	2.26	.97	2.49	2.51	2.54	2.78	2.63	2.37	2.15	2.22	1.97	.285

TABLE 54 Age Related To C57 Friends Share Military View

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
>/V	Enlisted/1st term	2.53	. 95	2.63	2,55	2.49	2.47	2.61	*	*	*	ķ	.052
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.71	.74	*	*	*	2.70	2.77	2.70	2.69	2.69	*	.049
(Men only)	Officers	2.57	.78	*	*	*	2.70	2.74	2.58	2.43 2.33	2.33	*	961.
CIVILIAN	Men	2.52	. 85	2.53	2.59	2.43	2.33	2.49	2.52	2.66	2.61	2.49	.083
SAMPLE	Women	2.60	.81	2.55	2.67	2.45	2.61	2.55	2.55	2.68	2.71	2.61	.072

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

TABLE 55 Age Related To I57 Military Job Opportunity

		Total	al			M	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	16-18 19-20	21-22	21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
	Enlisted/1st term	3.05	. 86	3.30	3.15	2.99	2.87	2.95	*	*	ł	*	.147
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3,68	[8	÷	*	-k	3.32	3.50	3.70	3.85	3.91	*	.212
Men only)	Officers	3.63	. 83	*	*	*	3.30	3.40	3.56	3.97	4.03	*	.326
CIVILIAN	Men	3.44	68.	3.52	3.42	3.22	3.26	3.37	3.41	3.42	3.44	3.51	.094
SAMPLE	Мотел	3.37	. 88	3.57	3.55	3.41	3.30	3.18	3.21	3.26	3.36	3.45	.139

TABLE 56 Age Related To I58 Military Leadership Quality

		Total	al			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29	30-34	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44	40-44	>45	Eta
>>	Enlisted/1st term	2.75	. 59	2.98	2.78	2.78 2.72	2.66	2.71	*	*	łk	*	.137
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.03	. 58	*	*	*	2.74	2.91	3.05	3.15	3,21	*	.218
(Men only) Officers	Officers	3.11	. 59	*	*	*	2.83	2.98	3.06	3.37	3,35	k	308
CIVILIAN	Men	3.14	. 59	3.26	3.02	2.87	2.83	3.04	3.15	3.17	3.25	3.20	.203
SAMPLE	Women	3.23	.52	3.29	3.15	3,17	3.27	3.16 3.25	3.25	3.19	3.31	3.24	.088

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

Age Related To I59 Total Military Influence Actual 57 TABLE

		Total	a]			Σ	ean Sco	res By	Mean Scores By Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	25-29	Mean S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	145	Eta
6	Enlisted/1st term	2.98 1.03	1.03	3.19	3.09	3.00	2.83	2.47	*	*	*	*	161
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.02	.79	*	*	*	2.45	2.07	1.87	2.05	1.99	*	,175
(Men only) Officers	Officers	2.10	.77	*	*	*	2.33	2.34	2.12	1.90	1.71	*	.310
CIVII IAN	Men	3.14 1.03	1.03	3.46	3.42	3,36	3.67	3.36	2.95	2.92	2.63	3,10	.245
SAMPLE	Women	3.25	1.09	3.58	3.49	3.64	3.57	3,34	3,21	3,18	3.11	3.12	.161

TABLE 58 Age Related To I60 Total Military Influence Ideal

		Total				X	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory				
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34	23-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta	
	Enlisted/1st term	3.32	.79	3.61	3.45	3.27	3.10	3.16	- x	+k	4-	*	.194	
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.68	.72	*	*	*	3.73	3.58	3.77	3.62	3.75	*	114	
(Men only)	Officers	3.04	.63	*	*	*	2.94	3.06	2.98	3.14	3.08	*	.095	
			0											
CIVILIAN	Men	3.15	88	3.09	2.84	3.00	2.90	3.05	3.05	3.26	3.21	3.27	.155	
SAMPLE	Women	3.20	.80	3.22	3,36	3.02	3.10	2.99	3.22	3,49	3.10	3.24	.162	4

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

TABLE 59 Age Related To 161 Discrepancy Foreign Conflict

1 0	TO.		01.31	00	M CC LC	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory		٨	ب ب
Mean		n.	2 - 0	07-61	3.U. 16-18 19-20 21-22	67-67 47-67	- 1	30-34 30-39	35-38	40-44	C+11	E L'A
4.13 1.95	_	.95	3.90	4.12	4.22	4.23	3.8]	ф	*	*	*	.063
2.71 1.49		.49	łk	*	łk	3.13	2.87	2.49	2.77	2.60	*	.125
3.53 1.44	-	.44	*	*	*	3.85	3.75	3.51	3.35	3.16	4	.163
4.30 1.81	-	.8	4.58	4.74	4.80	5.70	4.54	4.04	3.93	3.80	4.14	.232
4.26 1.69	_	69.	4.51	4.38	4.66	4.86	4.53	4.27	3.91	3.91 4.24	4.06	.146

TABLE 60 Age Related To 162 Discrepancy Field Tactics

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By	res By	Age Cat	Category			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	Mean S.D. 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	1745	Eta
2	Enlisted/1st term	3.69	3.69 1.53	3.67	3.71	3.75	3.78	3.12	k	ķ	*	+k	.100
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.30	1.52	*	*	÷	2.91	2.52	2.05	2.31	2.05	4¢	.162
(Men only)	Officers	2.58	2.58 1.64	ķ	*	*	3.00	2.89	2.78		2.20 1.82	ķ	.259
CIVILIAN	Men	3.91	3.91 1.54	4.23	4.68	4.03	4.27	4.40	3.77	3.62	3.33	3.78	.222
SAMPLE	Women	4.03	4.03 1.44	4.24	4.27	4.68	4.48	4.48 4.24	3.88	3.68	3.99	3.90	3.90 .163

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

TABLE 61 Age Related To I63 Discrepancy Weapon System

	Eta	.085	.120	.249	.219	.185
	245	*	*	ķ	3.72	3.83
	40-44	ķ	2.03	2.26	3.28	4.00
egory	35-39	*	2.34	2.70	3.85	3.68
Mean Scores By Age Category	30-34 35-39	*	1.99	3.27	3.78	4.27
res By		3.11	2.26	3.18	4.31	4.35
ean Sco	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	3.61	2.59	3.56	4.94	4.23
Σ	21-22	3.72	k	k	4.33	
	19-20	3.50	łk	*	4.32	4.44 4.24 4.87
	16-18	3.60	ł	*	4.32	4.44
tal	S.D.	3.57 1.77	2.19 1.49	3.01 1.68	3.93 1.74	4.07 1.59
Total	Mean	3.57		3.01	3.93	4.07
		Enlisted/1st term	Enlisted/later term	Officers	Men	Women
		-	SAMPLE	(Men only)	CTVIIIAN	SAMPLE

TABLE 62 Age Related To I64 Discrepancy Pay and Benefits

		Total	[e:			Σ	Mean Scores By	res By	Age Category	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	>45	Eta
<	Enlisted/1st term	3.08	3.08 1.81	3.05	3.12	3.12	3.08	2.77	*	*	łk	*	.047
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	1.78 1.38	1.38	ķ	*	ķ	1.94	1.93	1.42	1.98	1.91	ķ	.178
(Men only)	Officers	2.65 1.29	1.29	ķ	*	ķ	2.63	2.85	2.68	2.35	2.51	*	.132
	Men	3.80	3.80 1.60	4.15	4.19	4,15	4.25	3.97	3.85	3,35	3.23	3.73	.182
CIVILIAN	Women	3.76 1.52	1.52	4.18	3.63		4.10	3.98	3.56	3.61	3.75	3.66	.122

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

Age Related To 165 Discrepancy Use Nuclear Weapons 63 TABLE

		Total	[e]			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	- 1	19-20	21-22	23-24	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
NAVV	Enlisted/1st term	3.80	1.78	3.65	3.76	3.82	3.95	3.73	*	k	ĸ	*	.046
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.71	1.39	ķ	*	*	3.02	2.81	2.56	2.73	2.65	*	.091
(Men only)	Officers	3.53 1.11	1.1	ŧ	łk	*	3.89	3.71	3.44	3.23	3.37	*	. 186
CIVILIAN	Men	4.00 1.62	1.62	4.56	4.62	4.46	4.69	4.24	4.02	3.58	3.41	3.79 .239	.239
SAMPLE	Women	4.11 1.65	1.65	4.43	4.20 4.85	4.85	4.66	4.62	1.02	3.64	3.93	3.89	.207

TABLE 64 · Age Related To 166 Pro Citizen Soldiers

NAVY SAMPLE Enlisted/later term 2.65 .83 2.82 2.74 2.62 2.52 2.44 (Men only) Officers 2.20 .85 * * * 2.46 2.19			Total	al			Σ	ean Sco	Mean Scores By Age Category	Age Cat	egory			
/lst term 2.65 .83 /later term 2.13 .82 2.20 .85			Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	23-24		30-34 35-39	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
/later term 2.13 .82 2.20 .85	>\\\	Enlisted/1st term	2.65	. 83	2.82	2.74	2.62	2.52	2.44	*	*	*	ŧ	.127
2.20 .85	SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.13	. 82	*	k	*	2.23	2.16	2.08	2.18	1.96	k	.088
	en only)	Officers	2.20	. 85	*	ŧ	*	2.46	2.19	2.26	2.05	2.12	+k	.131
Men 2.50 .85	IVILIAN	Men	2.50		2.70	2.63	2.68	2.71	2.48	2.52	2.50	2.17	2.46	,158
SAMPLE Women 2.66 .84 2.91	SAMPLE	Women	2.66	. 84	2.91		2.81 2.66	2.81	2.70	2.75	2.69	2,53	2.57	.129

Age Related To 167 Pro Different Political Views 65 TABLE

		Total				Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res By	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	245	Eta
N N N	Enlisted/lst term	2.78	.75	2.71	2.73	2.79	2.79	3.01	*	*	÷	*	.089
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.75	.79	*	-jt	*	2.78	2.91	2.71	2.63	2.78	÷	.131
(Men only) Officers	Officers	3.13	.73	*	*	*	3.23	3.16	3.18	3.01	3.03	*	.103
CIVILIAN	Men	2.80	18.	2.71	2.93	3.01	2.96	2.96	2.85	2.82	2.72	2.71	.134
SAMPLE	Women	2.76	.80	2.80	2.74	3.01	2.75	2.81	2.84	2.84	2.73	2.68	901.

Dissent
Vietnam
168
O
Related
Aye
99
TABLE

		Total	a]			Σ	Mean Scores By Age Category	res Bý	Age Cat	egory			
		Mean S.D.	S.D.	16-18	19-20	21-22	16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-29 30-34 35-39	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	> 45	Eta
Enlisted/1st term		2.64	.65	2.46	2.60	2.68	2.68	2.76	*	*	*	*	
Enlisted/later term		2.19	99.	ķ	*	*	2.58	2.31	2.16	2.08	1.97	*	.218
(Men only) Officers		2.52	.72	÷k	*	÷	2.98	2.66	2.59	2.20	2.16	*	.354
Men	ľ	2.48	.73	2.42	2.73	2.82	2.77	2.67	2.41	2.32	2.30	2.41	.217
Women		2.45	.72	2.44	2.51	2.59	2.50	2.52	2.50	2.40	2.37	2.41	.083

^{*} Scores omitted due to small number in category.

.139 .229 .383 1.95 1.65 12.45 40-44 1.53 1.85 35 - 391.28 1.18 1.99 Mean Scores By Age Category 30-34 1.43 1.73 2.06 25-29 1,93 2.20 2.24 2.38 2.62 2.70 1.94 2.08 21-22 2.53 2.71 16-18 19-20 2.32 2.66 2.71 2.44 2,88 2.77 1.08 1.08 1.08 88 S.D. Age Related To I69 Pro Amnesty 2.54 1.94 1.46 1.65 Mean Enlisted/later term Enlisted/lst term Officers. Women Men 511 (Men only) 67 CIVILIAN SAMPLE NAVY SAMPLE 112

TABLE 68	Education Related To	157	litary J	Military Job Opportunity				02
		Tot	otal		Mean Scores by Education Category	y Education (Sategory	
		Mean	S.D.	less than 12 years	12 years	some college	college graduate	Eta
250	Enlisted/1st term	3.05	. 86	3.25	3.10	2.89	2.77	.150
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	3.70	.83	3.76	3.76	3.55	*	.114
(Men only)	Officers	3.64	80.	*	4.02	4.08	3.53	.250
CIVILIAN	Men	3.44	68.	3.59	3.50	3.21	3.27	.173
SAMPLE	Women	3.36	80	3.59	3,35	3,23	2,95	.228
TABLE 69	Education Related To	I68 Vi	Vietnam Dissent	ssent				
		Tot	otal		Mean Scores by	by Education Category	ategory	
		Mean	S.D.	less than 12 years	12 years	some college	college graduate	Eta
	Enlisted/lst term	2.64	. 65	2.53	2.58	2.74	3.02	.166
SAMPLE	Enlisted/later term	2.19	99.	2.18	2.16	2.26	*	.067
(Men only)	Officers	2.50	۲۱.	łĸ	2.12	2.09	2.60	.282
CIVILIAN	Men	2.47	.73	2.29	2.45	2.65	2.67	.210
SAMPLE	Women	2.45	.72	2.39	2.40	2.49	2.73	.149
2								

* Scores omitted due to small number in category.

INTERVIEW SECTION FROM CIVILIAN VERSION OF INSTRUMENT

Now we're going to turn to something different. The next questions ask about problems connected with managing the armed forces on an all-volunteer basis.

- E1. Some people think we should get rid of the military draft and use all volunteers to staff our armed forces, but others think we should continue to use the draft. Which do you favor?
 - 1. All volunteer armed forces
 - 2. Continue the draft
 - 3. Don't know
 - 4. Other
- Ela. What, if any, advantages do you see in an all-volunteer force?
- Elb. What, if any, disadvantages do you see in an all-volunteer force?
- E2. The armed forces are now offering higher pay to servicemen in order to get more people to enlist. Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?
 - 1. Good idea
 - 2. Poor idea
 - 3. Depends
 - 4. Don't know
- E2a. What, if any, advantages do you see in offering the higher pay?
- E2b. What, if any, disadvantages do you see in offering the higher pay?
- E3. An additional way of encouraging enlistment has been suggested: the plan is to offer four years of paid college or technical education in return for four years of service. The paid education would include full living expenses and tuition, and it could come either before or after the four years of service. On the whole, do you think this plan is a good one or a poor one?
 - 1. Good plan
 - 2. Poor plan
 - 3. Depends
 - 4. Don't know
- E3a. Is there anything in particular that you think is good about the paid education plan?
- E3b. Is there anything in particular that you think is <u>bad</u> about the paid education plan?

- E4. Do you think such a paid education plan might make any differences in the <u>kinds of men</u> who would enlist?
 - 1. Yes
 - 2. No
 - 3. Depends
 - 4. Don't know
- E4a. What sorts of differences do you think it might make in the kinds of men who would enlist?

The alternate Navy version of the questionnaire was identical to the civilian version for Parts A, B, and C. The questions in part D of the Navy version differed in several respects. Those items from Part D of the Navy version are listed below.

9.	Your Supervisor's number:
10.	How long have you been assigned to your present ship or station?
11.	How long have you been assigned to your present work group?
14.	What is your military status?
	1) Regular 2) Reserve
15.	What is your present enlistment or extension status?
	 First enlistment Extension of first enlistment Second enlistment Extension of second enlistment Third or later enlistment
16.	What do you plan to do when you complete this enlistment?
	 Re-enlist and make the Navy a career Re-enlist or extend but undecided about making the Navy a career Re-enlist or extend but do not intend to make the Navy a career Return to civilian life Retire
18.	Present Rate/Rank:
19.	Rating/Designator:

Indicate how important items 26 through 32 were in your

1) Extremely important

decision to join the Navy.

- 2) Important
- 3) Somewhat important
- 4) Not very important
- 5) Of no importance
- 26. Job opportunities looked better than in civilian life.
- 27. For travel, adventure, new experiences.
- 28. Opportunity for advanced education or technical training.

- 29. Wanted to fulfill my military obligation at a time and in the service of my choice rather than being drafted.
- 30. Wanted to serve my country.
- 31. To continue a family tradition of military service.
- 32. For a secure job with promotions and favorable retirement benefits.
- 33. How long have you worked in full time civilian jobs.
 - 1) none
 - 2) up to 6 months
 - 3) between 6 months and 1 year
 - 4) between 1 and 3 years
 - 5) more than 3 years
- 34. Your <u>new Service number (optional)</u>
- 35. What is your <u>own</u> supervisory number?

SELF-COMPLETED FORM

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH / THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN / ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48106

PLACE INTERVIEWER LABEL HERE	Interview Number O This respondent was interviewed. O This respondent was not interviewed.
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INTRODUCTION

A current national issue involves putting the military services on an all-volunteer (no draft) basis. Should this occur, it would mean that the armed forces must provide work settings and conditions comparable to those expected and experienced in civilian life.

This questionnaire is part of a study sponsored by the Navy in which we are attempting to learn more about the ways that the armed forces may have to change to fit in with the views and values of Americans.

This questionnaire includes items about your present job (if you have one), your past military experience (if any), and your attitudes and opinions in a number of areas.


If this study is to be helpful, it is important that you answer each question as thoughtfully and frankly as possible. This is not a test; there are no right or wrong answers.

The completed questionnaires are processed by automated equipment which summarizes the answers in statistical form. Your own individual answers will remain strictly confidential since they will be combined with those of many other persons in reports which are prepared.

Most people find this questionnaire interesting; we hope you will too. We appreciate your willingness to participate in this important project.

INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. Most questions can be answered by filling in one of the answer spaces. If you do not find the exact answer that fits your case, use the one that is closest to it.
- 2. Please answer all questions in order.
- 3. Remember, the value of the study depends upon your being straightforward in answering this questionnaire. You will not be identified with your answers.
- 4. This questionnaire is designed for automatic scanning of your responses. Questions are answered by marking the appropriate answer spaces (circles) as illustrated in this example:



- 5. Please use a soft pencil (No. 2 is ideal), and observe carefully these important requirements:
 - -Make heavy black marks that fill the circles.
 - Erase cleanly any answer you wish to change.
 - -Make no stray markings of any kind.
- 6. One of the major purposes of this research is to compare and contrast work experiences and organizational practices in the military services with those in civilian life.

ARE YOU PRESENTLY EMPLOYED (IN A JOB FOR PAY OUTSIDE THE HOME)?

- O YES: Please turn to the questions in PART A (next page), which ask about your present job and the organization in which you presently work.
- O NO: Please skip to PART B of this questionnaire (page 10). The questions there ask you about the kind of job and supervisor you would consider the most ideal. Please answer these items, even if you do not expect that you would ever hold a job outside the home.

for office use only 1a 2a 2_b 3a 3b 4a Extra Codes 1b (1)(2)(1)(2)2 (1)(2)(1)(2)3 (1)(2)(1)(2)4 (1)(2)1 00 111 111 1 00 10 1 1010 1 11 02 22 2 2 22 22 22 22 22 2 2|2 2|2|2|2|2|2|2|2|2|2 3 33 3 33 33 3 33 33 33 3 33 3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3|3 4 44 44 (A) 4 44 (A)(A) 44 44 44 4|4|4|4|4|4|4|4|4|4 (5) 5 5 (5)(5) 55 33 3 5 **(5)** 55 5|5|5|5|5|5|5|5 (6) 66 66 (G)(G) 66 (6)(6) 66 66 6|6|6|6|6|6|6|6 7 99 9|9|9|9|9|9|9|9|9 70 00 7 90 00 90 (8) 88 88 88 88 88 88 8|8|8|8|8|8|8|8 88

PART A

(BEFORE BEGINNING BE SURE YOU HAVE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE OPPOSITE PAGE)

These first questions are about your present job and the organization in which you presently work.

NOTE: Read these answer categories over carefully. Then answer each of the following questions by blackening in the numbered circle under the answer you want to give.

a very little extent	Fo a little extent	some extent	a great extent	a very great extent
To	To	10	To	To

- 1. To what extent is this organization generally quick to use improved work methods? ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- 2. To what extent does this organization have a real interest in the welfare and happiness of those who work here?
- 3. How much does this organization try to improve working conditions? (1) (2) (3) (4)
- 4. To what extent are work activities sensibly organized in this organization? 1 2 3 4 5
- 5. How adequate for your needs is the amount of information you get about what is going on in other departments or shifts?

 (2) (3) (4) (5)
- 6. How receptive are those above you to your ideas and suggestions? (2 3 4)
- 7. To what extent are you told what you need to know to do your job in the best possible way?

- 8. How are differences and disagreements between units or departments handled in this organization?
 - ① Disagreements are almost always avoided, denied, or suppressed
 - ② Disagreements are often avoided, denied, or suppressed
 - ③ Sometimes disagreements are accepted and worked through; sometimes they are avoided or suppressed
 - ① Disagreements are usually accepted as necessary and desirable and worked through
 - ⑤ Disagreements are almost always accepted as necessary and desirable and worked through

Very dissatisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Very satisfied
--	----------------

- 9. All in all, how satisfied are you with the persons in your work group? 1 2 3 4 5
- 10. All in all, how satisfied are you with your supervisor?
- 11. All in all, how satisfied are you with your job?
- 12. All in all, how satisfied are you with this organization, compared to most others? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- 13. Considering your skills and the effort you put into the work, how satisfied are you with your pay?
- 14. How satisfied do you feel with the progress you have made in this organization up to now?
- 15. How satisfied do you feel with your chance for getting ahead in this organization in the future?

Just to keep their jobs and avoid being chewed out To keep their jobs and to make money	itle or no influence ome uite a kit great deal
(3) To keep their jobs, make money, and to seek promotions (4) To keep their jobs, make money, seek promotions, and for the satisfaction of a job well done (5) To keep their jobs, make money, seek promotions, do a satisfying job, and because other people in their work group expect it	IN GENERAL, HOW MUCH SAY OR INFLUENCE DOES EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF PEOPLE HAVE ON WHAT GOES ON IN YOUR DEPARTMENT? 20. Lowest-level supervisors (supervisors of non-supervisory personnel) 1 2 3 4 5 21. Non-supervisory personne 1 2 3 4 5 22. How are objectives set in this organization? 1 Objectives are announced with no opportunity to raise questions or give comments
17. To what extent do you enjoy performing the actual day-to-day activities that make up your job? 1 ② ③ ④ ⑤ 18. To what extent are there things about working here (people, policies, or conditions) that encourage you to work hard? 1 ② ③ ④ ⑥	 ② Objectives are announced and explained, and an opportunity is then given to ask questions ③ Objectives are drawn up, but are discussed with subordinates and sometimes modified before being issued ④ Specific alternative objectives are drawn up by supervisors, and subordinates are asked to discuss them and indicate the one they think is best ⑤ Problems are presented to those persons who are involved, and the objectives felt to be best are then set by the subordinates and the
19. In general, how much say or influence do you have on what goes on in your work group? (a) (a) (b) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c) (c	supervisor jointly, by group participation and discussion To a fittle extent are decisions made at those levels where the most adequate and accurate information is available? (3) (4)

To a little extent To some extent To a great extent To a very great extent		To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
24. When decisions are being made, to what extent are the persons affected asked for their ideas? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	To what extent is your super your problems?	rviso	r willin	ng to	listen	to
25. Page la et all laugh of an apprinting application	32. This is how it is now:	0	2	3	4	(5)
25. People at all levels of an organization usually have know-how that could be of use to decision-makers. To what extent is information widely shared in this organization so that those who make decisions have	33. This is how I'd like it to	be:	@	3	4	(3)
access to all available know-how? ① ② ③ ④ ⑤	How much does your superv give their best effort?	isor	encou	rage p	eople	to
NOTE: IN QUESTIONS 26 THROUGH 54, SUPERVISOR MEANS THE PERSON TO WHOM YOU REPORT DIRECTLY.	34. This is how it is now:	1	2	3	4	(3)
26. When your supervisor has problems related to the work,	35. This is how I'd like it to	be:	2	3	4	(3)
to what extent does he use group meetings to talk things over with his subordinates and get their ideas? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	To what extent does your su standards of performance?	perv	visor m	aintai	n high	•
27. To what extent does your supervisor handle well the technical side of his jobfor example, general expert-	36. This is how it is now:	1	@	3	(4)	(3)
ness, knowledge of job, technical skills needed in his profession or trade? 1 2 3 4 5	37. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to	be:	2	3	4	(3)
FOR THE FOLLOWING SET OF ITEMS: PLEASE READ EACH QUESTION AND THEN ANSWER HOW IT IS NOW, AND HOW YOU'D LIKE IT TO BE.	To what extent does your su improve your performance?	perv	isor sh	ow y	ou ho	w to
How friendly and easy to approach is your supervisor?	38. This is how it is <u>now</u> :	1	2	3	(4)	(3)
28. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5	39. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to	be:	2	3	4	(3)
29. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: (1) ② ③ ④ ⑤	To what extent does your su help you need so that you co of time?					
When you talk with your supervisor, to what extent does he pay attention to what you're saying?	40. This is how it is now:	0	2	3	4	(5)
30. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5	41. This is how I'd like it to	be:	2	3	(4)	(3)
31. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤						

To a very little extent To a little extent To some extent To a great extent To a very great extent	To a little extent To a little extent To some extent To a great extent To a very great extent
To what extent does your supervisor offer new ideas for solving job-related problems? 42. This is how it is now: 1 2 3 4 5	52. Practice in making use of information he already has about how his people feel, how to be a good manager, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 53. A situation that lets him do what he already knows how to do and wants to do: 1 2 3 4 5
43. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤	54. More interest in and concern for the people who work for him: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
To what extent does your supervisor encourage the persons who work for him to work as a team?	IN THE QUESTIONS BELOW, WORK GROUP MEANS ALL THOSE PERSONS WHO REPORT TO THE SAME SUPERVISOR.
44. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5 45. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: 1 2 3 4 5	How friendly and easy to approach are the persons in your work group?
To what extent does your supervisor encourage people who work for him to exchange opinions and ideas?	55. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5 56. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: 1 2 3 4 5
46. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5 47. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: 1 2 3 4 5	When you talk with persons in your work group, to what extent do they pay attention to what you're saying?
	57. This is how it is <u>now</u> : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HOW MUCH DOES YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR NEED EACH OF THE FOLLOWING TO BE A BETTER MANAGER?	58. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: (1) ② (3) ④ (5)
	To what extent are persons in your work group willing to listen to your problems?
48. More information about how his people see and feel about things: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	59. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5
49. More information about principles of good management: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	60. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
50. A change in the kinds of things he personally feels are important: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	How much do persons in your work group encourage each other to give their best effort?
51. Greater ability in handling the administrative side of his job: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	61. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3 4 5
	62. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤

GO ON TO PAGE 8

To a very little extent To a little extent To some extent	To a great extent To a very great exten	To a very little extent To some extent To a great extent To a very great extent
To what extent do persons in your work gro- high standards of performance?	up maintain	How much do persons in your work group emphasize a team goal?
63. This is how it is <u>now</u> : ② ③	4 5	73. This is how it is <u>now</u> : ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
64. This is how I'd like it to be: ① ② ③	4 5	74. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
To what extent do persons in your work grofind ways to do a better job?	up help you	75. To what extent does your work group plan together and coordinate its efforts? ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
65. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3	4 5	76. To what extent does your work group make good decisions and solve problems well? 1 2 3 4 5
66. This is how I'd like it to be: ① ② ③	4 5	77. To what extent do persons in your work group know what their jobs are and know how to do them well? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
To what extent do persons in your work growthe help you need so that you can plan, organ schedule work ahead of time?		78. To what extent is information about important events and situations shared within your work group? 1 2 3 4 5
67. This is how it is <u>now</u> : 1 2 3	4 (5)	79. To what extent does your work group really want to meet its objectives successfully? 1 2 3 4 5
68. This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be: ① ② ③	4 5	80. To what extent is your work group able to respond to unusual work demands placed on 1?
To what extent do persons in your work gro		81. To what extent do you have confidence and trust in the
each other new ideas for solving job-related 69. This is how it is now: ① ② ③	4 5	persons in your work group? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
70. This is how I'd like it to be: ① ② ③	4 5	82. On the basis of your experience and information, how would you rate your work group on effectiveness? How well does it do in fulfilling its mission or achieving its goals in comparison with other work groups in this organization?
How much do persons in your work group e each other to work as a team?	ncourage	1) The work group does a rather poor job
71. This is how it is <u>now</u> : ① ② ③	a s	② Fair
72. This is how I'd like it to be:		③ Good
	(4)	(4) Very good
		(5) The work group does an excellent job

	rue	ne	63	itrue ue
How true is each of the fol-	S P	F-	Very true	THE PART OF THE PROPERTY OF TH
lowing statements about the	ry	irly	2	ry irly ry
job you have now?	Fa Ve	T G	> >	Fa Fa
83. There's no one to boss me on	the work	100		101. I don't get endlessly referred from person to person
oo. There is no one to boss me on	① ②	(3)	(4)	when I need help. ① ② ③ ④
				Wilder Hood Holps
84. It is steady, no chance of being	g laid off.			102. I don't have to go through a lot of "red tape" to get
	0 2	3	4	things done. ① ② ③ ④
		15	V	
85. I can learn new things, learn new	ew skills.			103. I don't get hemmed in by longstanding rules and regu-
	0	(3)	(4)	lations that no one seems to be able to explain.
86. I don't have to work too hard.	0	3	(4)	
oo. I don't have to work too hard.				e e
87. It is a clean job, where I don't	get dirty.			a very little extent a little extent some extent a great extent a very great exten
	0 2	3	4	ent it ent
				a very little e little extent some extent a great extent
88. It has good chances for getting	ahead.			y g
	0	3	4	a very some a grea
89. I don't have to take a lot of re				
65. I don't have to take a lot of re	Sponsibilit	y.	(4)	
			0	104. On the job, to what extent do you feel pressure from
90. It leaves me a lot of free time	to do wha	t war	nt	your supervisor for better performance, over and above
to do.	0 2	3	4	what you yourself think is reasonable?
	X a			0 2 3 4 5
91. The pay is good.	0 2	3	(4)	
	M. M.	200		105. To what extent is your job a one-person job; you
92. It is a job that my friends thin	K a lot of	- nas c	ass.	have little need to check or work with others?
	0	3	0	
93. It uses my skills and abilities -	lets me de	the t	hings	106. To what extent do you have to collaborate with other
I can do best.	0 2	3	(4)	in order to do a good job?
		1		0 2 3 4 5
94. There are nice friendly people	to work w	rith.	400	
	0	3	(4)	107. To what extent is the organization you work for
05 14 45/4				effective in getting you to meet its needs and contri- bute to its effectiveness?
95. It doesn't make me learn a lot	or new th	ings.		Dute to its effectiveness
		9	0	
96. It allows me to stay in one pla	ce so I car	n establ	lish	108. To what extent does the organization you work for de
roots in a community.	0 2	3	4	a good job of meeting your needs as an individual?
	M. X	W.	V	① ② ③ ④ ⑤
97. It gives me a chance to serve m	y country	well.		
	0	(3)	4	109. To what extent does your present job provide an op-
QQ Is gives me a shapes to make	ho world	lag stage	n lane	portunity to work for competent, fair supervisors?
98. It gives me a chance to make t		(3)	4	
		0		110. To what extent does your present job provide an
99. The fringe benefits (medical ca	re, retiren	ent pla	an, etc.)	opportunity to be evaluated fairly in proportion to
are good.	0 2	3	4	what you contribute? ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
		N. Carlotte		
100. I can control my personal life.	(1) (2)	(3)	(4)	

a very little extent	a little extent	some extent	a great extent	a very great extent
2	5	F	2	To

- 111. To what extent do you feel in any way discriminated against in your job because of your race or national origin?

 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- 112. Nearly all jobs involve using some kind of tool or machine. In your job, what is the most complex type of tool or machine you use every day?
 - 1) simple devices (pencils, letter opener, wiping cloth)
 - ② hand tools (manual typewriter, wrenches, wheelbarrow)
 - 3 small power-driven machines (electric drill, electric typewriter, 2-cycle engine)
 - power-driven equipment (car or truck, airplane, electronic equipment, copy machine, hoist)
 - (5) automated equipment (largely computerdirected)
- 113. Are the objects or materials you work on in your job the same or different?
 - 1) There is no variation from case to case.
 - ② There is only slight variation from case to case.
 - 3 Some of the cases are similar and some are unique.
 - 4 Most cases are somewhat unique.
 - 5 Each case is almost totally unique.
- 114. In your job, how much time usually passes between your performance of an average unit of work and the time you find out how well you did?
 - 1 a few seconds or less
- 4 less than a day
- 2 a few minutes
- 5 longer than a day
- (3) less than an hour

115.	What	race	İs	your	immediate	supervisor?
------	------	------	----	------	-----------	-------------

- ① White
- ② Black
- (3) Mexican-American
- (4) Other
- 116. What race are the majority of the members of your work group (those individuals who report to the same supervisor you do)?
 - ① White
 - ② Black
 - (3) Mexican-American
 - 4 Other
- 117. What other race (if any) is most heavily represented in your work group?
 - ① White
 - ② Black
 - 3 Mexican-American
 - (4) Other
 - (5) None

PART B

These questions ask about the kind of job and supervisor you would consider most ideal. Please answer them in terms of the kind of job you would like to have.

In thinking about the kind of a job you would like to have (whether or not you have it now), how important are each of the following?	Very Unimportant	Fairly Unimportant	Fairly Important	Very Important
1. A job where there's no one to be			-	-
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2. A job that is steady, no chance	of bei	ng lai	d off	4
3. A job where I can learn new thi	ngs, le	arn n	1	-
		(2)	(3)	(4)
4. A job where I don't have to wo	rk too	hard	(3)	(4)
5. A clean job, where I don't get d	(T)	2	3	4
6. A job with good chances for get	ting a	head	3	(4)
7. A job where I don't have to tak responsibility	e a lo	of ②	3	4
8. A job that leaves me a lot of fre	e tim	e to d	lo wh	at ④

		Very Unimportant	Unimportant	Fairly Important	Very Important
		Very	Fairly	Fairly	Very
9.	A job where the pay is good	1	2	3	(4)
10.	A job that my friends think a l	ot of	has c	(3)	4
11.	A job that uses my skills and a the things I can do best	bilities	e lets	me do	4
12.	A job that has nice friendly peo	ople to	worl 2	with	4
13.	A job that doesn't make me lea	arn a l	ot of	new t	hings (4)
14.	A job that allows me to establis nity and not have to move fron	200	3 6	200	nu-
15.	A job that gives me a chance to	serve	my o	ountr 3	y well
16.	A job that gives me a chance to better place	make	the t	world	a
17.	A job where the fringe benefits ment plan, etc.) are good	(med	ical ca	(3)	tire-
18.	A job where I can control my p	erson	al life	3	4
19.	A job where I don't get endless person to person when I need h		erred	from (3)	(4)
20.	A job where I don't have to go tape" to get things done	throu	igh a l	ot of	red
21.	A job where I am not hemmed rules and regulations that no or explain	31	-	16 /5	200

	w much do you agree			agree nor disagree	3		PA
	h the following state-			ō			The
	nts about the way	ree	0	100			mili
sup	ervisors should treat	Sag	agr	9	0	ree	ask
the	people who work	à.	disagree	gre	agree	ag	oth
uni	der them?	Strongly disagree			2	Strongly agree	
		-Con	Slightly	Neither	ght	no	
		52	22	Se	55	Sti	
						100	То
22.	A supervisor should help	othe	rs to	expres	s their	own	thin
	individuality.	1	2	3	4	(5)	por
					Aug pa		top
23.	A good supervisor must	pay a	s muc	h dire	ct atte	ention	the
	to keeping people working	ng to	gether	well a	s he	does	
	to seeing that the task go	ets do	one.	1			
		0	2	(3)	4	(5)	
							1. /
24.	Supervisors should rely n	nore	on mu	tual c	onfide	ence	
	and good relationships w						
	exercise of authority to		0.7				2. /
	,,	0	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
25	In work relationships, en	notio	ns and	feelir	nge sha	ould	
	be expressed and worked			00111	193 311	Jana	3. A
	be expressed and worker		(2)	3	(4)	(5)	
		0		0	0	9	
26	It is essential for the goo	of em	oorvied	r to b	o con	itivo to	
20.	the feelings of others.	(I)	(2)	(3)	4		
	the reenings of others.	U	6	9	9	(5)	4. /
27	A alone and biomeraby of	auth.	anima o	nd ros	nonei	hiliti	
21.	A clear-cut hierarchy of is essential in a work org			nu res	housi	Diffty	
	is assaurial ill a work ora		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
			6	9	9	0	5. /
20	Dalas flow with aubandia	25.00	io the	boot u	unit to		
20.	Being firm with subording	200	12 file	Dest v	vay Lo	Illsure	
	that they will do a good	OD.	0	0	0	6	
		U	6	(3)	(4)	(5)	6.
00	Outrouttanes modernes la	111		a de la co	4		
29.	Subordinates prefer to b			atner	than	naking	1
	their own decisions in th	eir w					
		0	2	3	4	(5)	
					. 8		
30.	A supervisor must keep a						7. T
	ordinates to see that the	y are	The same of		1000	P. Carrier	t
		0	2	3	4	(5)	
31.	The most effective way			7		5 10	
	committed to a job is to			irect a	ind us	e	8. T
	appropriate rewards and	pena	0 1				t
		(1)	2	3	4	(5)	
					-		
32.	Although a supervisor ca					nis	
	subordinates, he must sti	il str	ucture	their	work		
	for them.	1	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	

PART C

These next questions ask for your opinions about the military services in the United States. Some questions ask about the way you think things actually are, and others ask about the way you would like things to be.

To what extent do you think the following opportunities are available to people who work in the military services?	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
1. A chance to get ahead	0	2	3	4	(3)
2. A chance to get more educ	cation	2	3	4	(5)
3. A chance to advance to a	more ①	respor ②	sible	positi (4)	on ⑤
4. A chance to have a person	ially r	more f	ulfillir ③	ng job	(5)
5. A chance to get their idea	s hear	d ②	3	(4)	(5)
6. To what extent is it likely can get things changed and treated unjustly by a supe	d set				
	1	3	3	4	(5)
To what extent do you the tion against women who a					Y
8. To what extent do you th tion against black people w					

just and fair treatment as a civilian or as a member of the military service? ① Much more fair in the military service ② More fair in the military service ③ About the same ④ More fair as a civilian	and thrown out the civilian government. Do you thin there is any chance that this could happen in the United States? ① It probably will happen in the U. S. ② It is certainly possible, but not very likely. ③ It is nearly impossible. ④ It could never happen in the U. S.
 (§) Much more fair as a civilian (§) Question not appropriate for me 10. If you had a son in his late teens or early twenties who decided to enter the military service, how would you 	a very little extent a little extent some extent a great extent a very great extent
feel about his decision? ① Strongly positive ② Mostly positive	To a very To a littl To a grea
3 Mostly negative4 Strongly negative	17. To what extent do you think our armed forces are capable of meeting all of our present military needs? ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
Agree Mostly Disagree Mostly	18. To what extent do you think the military makes efficient use of the money in its budget? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 19. To what extent do you think our military leaders are smart people who know what they are doing? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
11. The United States should provide high enough salaries and benefits so that it can man its armed forces with volunteers. 1 ② ③ ④	20. To what extent would it be possible to improve the caliber of our officer ranks? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
12. Most of our servicemen should be "citizen soldiers" - men who spend just three or four years in the military and then return to civilian life. 1 2 3 4	21. To what extent do we fall short of the military pre- paredness we need in today's world? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 22. To what extent is there waste in the way our military
13. Our military service should be staffed mostly with "career men" who spend twenty or more years in the service. 1 ② ③ ④	services are run at present? ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
14. Only those who agree with our military policy should be allowed to serve in the armed forces.	23. To what extent do you think military officers try to do as good a job as they can? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
15. There ought to be a wide range of different political viewpoints among those in the military service. (1) ② ③ ④	24. To what extent do you think you can trust our military leadership to do what is right? 1 2 3 4 5

GO ON TO PAGE 14

25. All things considered, do you think the armed services presently have too much or too little influence on the way this country is run? ① Far too much ② Too much	Civilians much more Civilians somewhat more About equal influence Military somewhat more
③ About right	Who has most influence over what tactics to use on the
(4) Too little	battlefield? 30. This is how I think it is now:
⑤ Far too little	0 0 3 4 5
26. Do you think the U. S. spends too much or too little on the armed services? ① Far too much	31. This is how I'd like it to be (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
② Too much	Who has most influence over which new weapon systems to develop?
③ About right	32. This is how I think it is now: 1 2 3 4 5
4 Too little	33. This is how I'd like it to be:
⑤ Far too little	
27. Overall, how do you feel about the role of the military services in our society during the time since World War II - has it been mostly positive or mostly negative?	Who has most influence over levels of pay and fringe benefits in the armed services? 34. This is how I think it is now: 1 2 3 4 5
① Strongly Positive ② Mostly Positive	35. This is how I'd like it to be: 1 2 3 4 5
③ Mostly Negative	Who has most influence over whether to use nuclear
Strongly Negative	weapons? 36. This is how I think it is now:
The next questions ask your opinion about the influence that military leaders and civilian leaders (such as the President or Congress) have over certain decisions affecting	37. This is how I'd like it to be:
national security.	Agree Mostly Disagree Mostly
	38. The U. S. should begin a gradual program of disarming whether other countries do or not. 1 ② 3 4
Who has most influence over whether to involve U. S. servicemen in foreign conflicts? 28. This is how I think it is now: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	39. There may be times when the U. S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries. 1 2 3 4 40. The U. S. should be willing to go to war to protect
29. This is how I'd like it to be: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤	its own economic interests. ① ② ③ ④ GO ON TO PAGE 14

	Agree Mostly Disagree Mos	Agree Mostly Disagree Mos
41.	The only good reason for the U. S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on our own country. (1) (2) (3) (4)	53. Servicemen should obey orders without question. (1) (2) (3) (4)
	The U. S. does not need to have greater military power than the Soviet Union. 1 2 3 4	54. Suppose a group of soldiers in Vietnam were ordered by their superior officers to shoot all inhabitants of a village suspected of aiding the enemy including old men, women and children? In your opinion, what
43.	The U. S. ought to have much more military power than any other nation in the world.	should the soldiers do in such a situation? ① Follow orders and shoot ② Refuse to shoot them
44.	Our present foreign policy is based on our own narrow economic and power interests. 1 2 3 4	③ Don't know
45.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been damaging to our national honor or pride. 1 2 3 4	55. What do you think most people actually would do if they were in this situation? (1) Follow orders and shoot
46.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has not really been in the national interest. 1 2 3 4	② Refuse to shoot them
47.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to fight the spread of Communism. (1) (2) (3) (4)	3 Don't know 56. What do you think you would do in this situation?
48.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has brought us closer to world war.	① Follow orders and shoot ② Refuse to shoot them
49.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to protect friendly countries. 1 2 3 4	③ Don't know
50.	Fighting the war in Vietnam has been important to show other nations that we keep our promises. (1) (2) (3) (4)	57. In general to what extent do your friends agree (disagree) with your views on the armed forces? ① Practically all agree
51.	Going to Canada to avoid fighting in Vietnam was wrong, and those who did so should be punished. 1 2 3 4	② Many agree ③ Some agree, some disagree
52.	The men who went to Canada rather than fight in Vietnam were doing what they felt was right. They should be allowed to return to the U. S. without being punished.	(4) Many disagree (5) Practically all disagree

PART D

These final few questions ask for some background information about yourself. The information is important for research purposes. Your answers to all questions will be kept strictly confidential.

			00	
. Present Age		-	00	
	Write in		22	
			33	
Sex:	1) Male	② Female	44	
			55	
Race:			66	
① W	hite	3 Mexican-American	00	
2 BI	a c k	4 Other	88	
			99	
	Sex: Race:	Write in Sex: ① Male	Write in Sex: ① Male ② Female Race: ① White ③ Mexican-American	Write in (2 (2 (3 (3 (3 (3 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4 (4

4.	How	much	schooling	have	you	had?	
		① Co	mpleted	grade	scho	ol or	less

- 2 Some high school
- 3 Completed high school
- (4) Some college
- (5) Completed college
- 6 Some graduate school

5. H	ow	much	schooling	has	your	father	had?
------	----	------	-----------	-----	------	--------	------

- (1) Completed grade school or less
- 2 Some high school
- 3 Completed high school
- 4 Some college
- (5) Completed college
- 6 Some graduate school

6. How much schooling has your mother had?

- 1) Completed grade school or less
- (2) Some high school
- (3) Completed high school
- (4) Some college
- (5) Completed college
- 6 Some graduate school

7. While you were growing up - say until you were eighteen - what kind of community did you live in for the most part?

- ① Rural area or farm
- 2 Town or small city
- 3 Suburban area near a large city
- 4 Large city
- 8. While you were growing up, what region of the country did you primarily live in?
 - 1 New England
 - ② East
 - 3 South
 - (4) Midwest
 - (5) West
 - 6 None of the above

IF NOT WORKING OUTSIDE THE HOME, SKIP TO QUESTION 12. 00000

	00000
	00000
9a. What company do you	22222
work for?	33333
	44444
	5555
	66666
9b. If this is a part of a	99999
larger company, what	8888
company is it?	99999

- 10. How long have you worked there?
 - (1) less than 1 month
 - 2 between 1 and 6 months
 - 3 between 6 months and 1 year
 - 4 between 1 and 2 years
 - (5) between 2 and 5 years
 - 6 between 5 and 10 years
 - ① between 10 and 15 years
 - 8 more than 15 years

11. How long have you been a member of your present work group?

- (1) less than 1 month
- 2) between 1 and 6 months
- 3 between 6 months and 1 year
- (4) between 1 and 2 years
- (5) between 1 and 5 years
- 6 between 5 and 10 years
- (7) between 10 and 15 years
- (8) more than 15 years

12.	Were	you	assigne	d a	draft	lottery	number	?
		0	100	(2)	No (s	kin to	question	14)

UT	es	9	INO	(skip) [[ques	LIUI

14.	Have	you	ever.	served	in	any	branch	of
	theis	ervic	2?					

13. What is your lottery number?..

- 1) Yes ② No (skip to 22)
- 15. If yes, what branch did you serve in?
 - ① Army
 - 2 Navy
 - (3) Air Force
 - (4) Marines
 - (5) Coast Guard

4.0	10/000		drafte	-42
10.	vvere	you	urarte	su:

- 1) Yes (2) No
- (if yes, skip to Q. 18)

17.	Do you think you would have been draft	fted if you	TOD OFFICE USE	ONLLY
	had not enlisted?		FOR OFFICE USE	UNLY
	① Yes ② No	③ Not applicable	36. Fam. Code	
	What was the highest rank you reached in the service? What was your specialty or rating? What was your specialty or rating? Barbara and services are services are services and services are services and services are services and services are services are services and services are services are services are services and services are services	000 111 222 333 444 555 665 777 888 999	(a) F (H) (b) M (W) (c) S 16-17 (c) S 18-19 (c) S 20-21 (c) S 22-25 (c) D 16-17 (c) D 18-19 (c) D 20-21 (c) D 22-25 (d) Misc. (d) (e)	
20.	Would you say your feelings about havi military are ① Strongly positive ② Mostly positive ③ Mostly negative ④ Strongly negative	ng been in the		
	Which of the following best describes th your family when they first learned you to enter the service? ① They were very much in favor ② Somewhat in favor ③ Neutral or indifferent ④ Somewhat dissatisfied ⑤ Very much dissatisfied How many of the following relatives hav armed forces? Parents, children, brothers ① None of them ④ Three of t	of it re served in the s, sisters, spouse?	37. Log Number 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8	
	② One of them ⑤ Four of them ③ Two of them ⑥ Five or mo	nem	9999	
23.	What were their feelings about having be military service? ① Strongly positive ② Mostly positive ③ Mostly negative ④ Strongly negative ⑤ Not applicable	peen in the	38. Intv. O Yes O No	
	What are your feelings about their having been in the military service? ① Strongly positive ② Mostly positive ③ Mostly negative ④ Strongly negative ⑤ Not applicable	00 10 22 33 44 55 66		
25.	How many years of active duty have yo served? (Round to the nearest year.)	00 (7 (7) (8 (8)		

99

